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Brain Decoders 
Abstract 
Functional neuroimaging has opened the door for examining in vivo neural processes for human 
perception, cognition, and behavior. Naturally, we wonder if we can ‘read the mind’ from brain images. 
Typical methods of fMRI are not apt for this, however, as it is aimed at answering ‘given a mental state, 
which brain region is active?’ rather than ‘given a brain activity, which mental state?’. As a solution, I 
examine a method using the entire brain to build ‘brain decoders’ that can empirically measure mental 
processes. Since different mental processes are unlikely to share the exact same pattern of whole-brain 
activity, whole-brain decoders could improve specificity to mental processes. Simultaneously, because it 
recruits multiple regions’ signals, whole-brain decoders could also improve our sensitivity to detect 
mental processes. In the first study, I address the statistical and substantive difficulties of whole-brain 
decoders and propose a novel algorithm that can overcome them. In the second study, I build a whole-
brain decoder of valuation across two economic decision-making tasks and show how a post-hoc 
analysis of the decoder can yield insight into signal relationships between different regions. In the third 
study, I showcase how empirical measurements of mental processes can be used in psychological 
research. Existing theories have posited that people discount delayed rewards because they are imagined 
less vividly than immediate rewards. I provide neural evidence to this claim by building a whole-brain 
decoder of imagination vividness on one dataset and show that it can also predict temporal delay in two 
other datasets of delay discounting task. This dissertation, taken together, shows that whole-brain 
decoders can be an easy analysis to implement that captures unique neural signatures of tasks and 
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Joseph W. Kable & Eric T. Bradlow 
Functional neuroimaging has opened the door for examining in vivo neural processes for human 
perception, cognition, and behavior. Naturally, we wonder if we can ‘read the mind’ from brain 
images. Typical methods of fMRI are not apt for this, however, as it is aimed at answering ‘given 
a mental state, which brain region is active?’ rather than ‘given a brain activity, which mental 
state?’. As a solution, I examine a method using the entire brain to build ‘brain decoders’ that can 
empirically measure mental processes. Since different mental processes are unlikely to share the 
exact same pattern of whole-brain activity, whole-brain decoders could improve specificity to 
mental processes. Simultaneously, because it recruits multiple regions’ signals, whole-brain 
decoders could also improve our sensitivity to detect mental processes. In the first study, I 
address the statistical and substantive difficulties of whole-brain decoders and propose a novel 
algorithm that can overcome them. In the second study, I build a whole-brain decoder of 
valuation across two economic decision-making tasks and show how a post-hoc analysis of the 
decoder can yield insight into signal relationships between different regions. In the third study, I 
showcase how empirical measurements of mental processes can be used in psychological 
research. Existing theories have posited that people discount delayed rewards because they are 
imagined less vividly than immediate rewards. I provide neural evidence to this claim by building 
a whole-brain decoder of imagination vividness on one dataset and show that it can also predict 
temporal delay in two other datasets of delay discounting task. This dissertation, taken together, 
shows that whole-brain decoders can be an easy analysis to implement that captures unique neural 
signatures of tasks and provide measurements of mental processes and constructs. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
We, humans, have yet to figure out how exactly this hemisphere, barely 6~7 inches in 
diameter, sitting in a insulated chamber behind our eyes, can solve innumerable complex tasks 
pivotal to our survival and yet still have some and bandwidth time left over to ponder about its 
existence. Nevertheless, with recent advancements in neuroimaging, we have made significant 
headway in statistically quantifying the degree of relationship between local brain activities and a 
menagerie of human perceptions, cognitions, and behaviors. As obvious as it sounds to us today, 
perceiving objects with our eyes is associated with increased activity in the visual cortex, and 
movement of our body parts is associated with activity in the motor cortex. Perhaps less 
obviously, the degree to which we place value on a given object or an option is reflected in the 
activity of ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Bartra, McGuire, & Kable, 2013; Kable & Glimcher, 
2007; Karmarkar, Shiv, & Knutson, 2015; Knutson, Taylor, Kaufman, Peterson, & Glover, 2005; 
D. J. Levy & Glimcher, 2012; I. Levy, Lazzaro, Rutledge, & Glimcher, 2011; Plassmann, 
O’Doherty, & Rangel, 2010, 2007), and our language processing is reflected in the 
temporoparietal junction (DeWitt & Rauschecker, 2012, 2013; Price, 2012). These findings come 
from many experiments that manipulated the inputs to our brains (or the outputs from our brains), 
observing a localized activity in a brain region, and ascribing to it, a potential function that is 
related to the inputs and outputs that were manipulated. 
 However, we soon learned that it is often difficult to assign a single role to a given 
region. First, any given stimuli or task will likely result in activity of multiple brain regions. 
Second, some of those regions, especially those in frontal areas of the brain, will likely appear in 
other seemingly unrelated tasks as well. The ventromedial prefrontal cortex not only reflects 
valuation signals, but also reflect movement directions in spatial navigation (Constantinescu, 
O’Reilly, & Behrens, 2016; Doeller, Barry, & Burgess, 2010); the temporoparietal junction, while 
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famous for including Wernicke’s area for language processing, is also known to be active when 
we put ourselves in other peoples’ shoes to empathize or to simulate others’ beliefs (Kanske, 
Böckler, Trautwein, Lesemann, & Singer, 2016; Kanske, Böckler, Trautwein, & Singer, 2015; R. 
Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003; Rebecca Saxe & Powell, 2006; Young, Cushman, Hauser, & Saxe, 
2007; Young, Dodell-Feder, & Saxe, 2010). The most notorious example comes from a non-peer-
reviewed study, published in the New York Times, that claimed that people literally love their 
iPhones, because seeing their iPhones results in activity in the insula, which has been associated 
with feelings of love before. Around 50 neuroscientists wrote a disappointed letter to the editor 
that read “The region that he points to as being “associated with feelings of love and compassion” 
(the insular cortex) is a brain region that is active in as many as one third of all brain imaging 
studies.” Known as the reverse inference problem, inferring a mental state given brain activity is 
more complex for regions that are active in a variety of tasks. 
 It is here that this dissertation attempts to venture a path forward, with a simple idea: 
instead of inferring mental states from one region, we should try to infer mental states using the 
entire brain and the pattern of activity within. The activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
may be caused by many things, but if it’s co-activated with ventral striatum and posterior 
cingulate cortex, there’s a good chance that it is a valuation signal. Temporoparietal junction may 
be involved in multiple activities, but if it’s joined by middle and inferior temporal gyri and 
supplemental motor area, that is likely someone producing speech. By combining multiple 
regions’ signals across the brain, we can reduce the chances of making a wrong inference (i.e., 
increase the specificity of inference), while simultaneously increasing our power to detect a given 
mental state even when one region is missing (i.e., increase the sensitivity of inference). 
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 It’s important to acknowledge, before proceeding, that the idea of whole-brain prediction 
is not new. It’s just unpopular. For example, Wager et al. (2013) has combined principal 
component analysis with penalized regression to build a whole-brain decoder of pain. Smith and 
colleagues used whole-brain data in a penalized regression model to decode peoples’ preferences 
between items (Smith, Douglas Bernheim, Camerer, & Rangel, 2014). Kragel and Labar used 
partial least squares discriminant analysis to develop categorical predictors of 7 emotional states 
(Kragel & LaBar, 2014). Grosenick, Greer and Knutson developed a spatially penalized version 
of the elastic net regression to build predictors of consumer purchases (Grosenick, Greer, & 
Knutson, 2008). Despite these uses, two reasons make such whole-brain approach less favored 
than partial-brain approaches. A first difficulty is interpretability. Whole-brain predictors, as it is 
currently implemented, are often difficult to interpret. For neuroscientists, who want to know the 
brain regions that are predictive of certain behavior or mental state, it does not suffice to know 
that the prediction is possible via some black-box algorithm; rather the resulting predictor must 
shed light on identifying key regions and setting them apart from regions that are not predictive. 
Unfortunately, in the absence of prediction algorithms specialized for fMRI, off-the-shelf 
methods for dealing with high-dimensional data are often not suited for identifying clusters of 
signals that can be localized as a region. A second difficulty is that dealing with all brain regions 
simultaneously is statistically and computationally challenging. With many variables but few 
observations, researchers need to rely on modern methods such as machine learning to produce 
predictors; unfortunately, many such methods take considerable amount of computational 
resources which render the method less accessible than partial-brain prediction approaches. 
 Naturally, the first step of this dissertation is to provide a novel method, suited for fMRI, 
that can build interpretable whole-brain decoders in a short time with little computational 
resources. In the first study, I introduce a new algorithm, named Thresholded Partial Least 
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Squares (TPLS), that exploits analytical properties of partial least squares algorithms to build 
high-dimensional predictors with very little computation. I demonstrate, in a large fMRI dataset 
of intertemporal choice and risky choice, that TPLS is much faster to train compared to other 
methods while still having high predictive power. Most importantly, I compare the resulting 
whole-brain decoders from TPLS and other extant methods, using both simulation and real data, 
to show that TPLS whole-brain decoders lead to clustered localized signal that identifies key 
predictor regions. 
 The second study highlights what we can learn from the whole-brain predictor created 
from study 1 by analyzing it in detail. When examined, I found that the whole-brain predictor of 
value contains many regions with negative regression coefficients, despite the fact that no brain 
region has signal that is negatively correlated with value. From this observation, we get the clue 
that there may be common noise in the value signal that hinders prediction of choice; 
consequently, the whole-brain predictor pits some of the regions against each other to cancel out 
this common noise while retaining the value signal. Based on this empirical finding, I found that 
while peoples’ choices were not affected by the values of options in past trials, the current neural 
value signal was affected by them. This history dependency, which is only found in neural signal 
of value but not in value-based behavior, becomes the ‘noise’ that the whole-brain predictor tries 
to filter out. This study demonstrates, above the important finding that neural correlates of value 
have history dependency, that we can learn more about the nature of the neural signals by 
examining the whole-brain predictor. 
 The third and final study of this dissertation showcases how ‘decoding the brain’ can be 
put to use in psychological research. There are several existing theories such as construal level 
theory arguing that the reason people discount delayed rewards is because delayed rewards, due 
to their temporal distance, are imagined less vividly (or are construed more abstractly) than 
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immediate rewards (Liberman & Trope, 2014; Rick & Loewenstein, 2008; Trope & Liberman, 
2010). The vividness of imagination is, needless to say, a very subjective experience that can be 
difficult to probe with behavioral measures such as self-reports. Furthermore, asking participants 
about how vividly they considered the delayed reward can easily lead to experimenter expectancy 
bias. This is where a ‘neural read’ of the brain can be immensely useful. I provide neural 
evidence for these theories by first constructing a brain-decoder of ‘imagination vividness’ on a 
dataset where participants were instructed to imagine about vivid and non-vivid scenarios. Then, 
on two completely separate delay discounting datasets, I show that the decoder’s reading of 
peoples’ brain when performing delay discounting task, is negatively correlated with delay of the 
reward, suggesting that rewards that are farther in time are indeed imagined less vividly. 
 The three studies in this dissertation makes a strong argument to researchers to consider 
using whole-brain decoders in their research. The first study provides a fast, easy to use algorithm 
with interpretable results in two statistical languages (MATLAB & R). The second study shows 
how examining the whole-brain decoder can lead to further understanding of the neural signals 
involved. The third study shows that whole-brain decoders can measure mental processes and 







CHAPTER 2 – Building a Brain Decoder: Application of Thresholded Partial Least Squares 
 




Recent neuroimaging research has shown that it’s possible to decode mental states and 
predict future consumer behavior from brain activity data (a time-series of images). However, the 
unique characteristics (and high dimensionality) of neuroimaging data, coupled with a need for 
neuro-scientifically interpretable models, has largely discouraged the use of off-the-shelf 
prediction methods. Instead, most neuroscientific research uses only “regionalized” (partial-brain) 
data, leading to a loss of potential information, and simple methods to reduce the computational 
burden and to improve interpretability (i.e., localizability of signal). Here we propose a novel 
approach that can build whole-brain neural decoders (using the entire data set and capitalizing on 
the full correlational structure) that are both interpretable and computationally efficient. We 
exploit analytical properties of partial least squares algorithm to build a regularized regression 
model with variable selection that boasts (in contrast to most statistical methods) a unique ‘fit-
once-tune-later’ approach where users need to fit the model only once and can choose the best 
tuning parameters post-hoc. We demonstrate its efficacy in a large neuroimaging dataset against 
off-the-shelf prediction methods and show that our new method scales exceptionally with 
increasing data size, yields more interpretable results, and uses less computational memory, while 







 Functional neuroimaging has allowed researchers to empirically examine the relationship 
between brain activity and various mental processes. In particular, functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) has shown great success in correlating brain activity with various behaviors and 
cognitive processes. Brain activities are measured in small grids, in 3D units known as voxels 
(i.e., volumetric pixels), and a typical fMRI image of the brain can have anywhere between 
40,000~200,000 voxels. Therefore, while a single scan of brain activity contains a large number 
of variables (i.e. a classic large P problem), the number of subjects (observations) are relatively 
much smaller (i.e. a classic small N problem) as it needs to be collected via an in-person 
experimental task, conducted inside an MRI machine, usually operated by a trained technician. 
Therefore, the regime of predicting cognitive states and behavior using voxels in fMRI is in the 
domain of , where the number of predictors far outweigh the number of observations. 
This has led most studies in neural prediction to focus on small cutouts of the brain (lowering P), 
wherein researchers have a priori interest/scientific theory. 
 But the sheer number of predictors, by itself, is not the only reason why most neural 
prediction studies focus on partial-brain prediction. For neuroscientific research, it’s less 
important that prediction of behavior is possible than to know which brain area makes it so. 
Modern methods for high-dimensional data are not too helpful for the researcher unless the 
predictor is interpretable and can lead to scientific insights about the brain. Concordantly, instead 
of whole-brain prediction, a common method has been to use ‘searchlight analysis’ that iterates 
through the brain, taking a handful of local voxels at a time, to identify which regions can predict 
the given behavior or cognitive states above chance (Etzel, Zacks, & Braver, 2013). 
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 However, ideally, neural prediction should be done using all the voxels in the brain for 
several reasons. First, a whole-brain predictor can provide higher sensitivity than ROI methods to 
decode mental states by combining signals across the entire brain. Second, it can also provide 
higher specificity by providing a unique predictor for each mental state, while any given region of 
the brain may co-activate with many different mental states. Third, a whole-brain predictor can 
give insight into how different regions’ signals are combined, much like how regression can give 
different answers than pairwise correlations. These benefits, coupled with recent advent of large-
scale datasets and collaborations in neuroimaging, has opened doors for construction of 
generalized whole-brain decoders. For example, Wager et al. (2013) has constructed a whole-
brain signature of pain that predicts the degree of pain an individual feels. Smith et al. (2014) and 
Lee, Lerman, & Kable, (2019) has constructed whole-brain predictors of valuation. In particular, 
Lee et al. (2019) shows how a whole-brain predictor can reveal complementary relationships 
between different brain regions that cannot be assessed from region-based methods. 
 Unfortunately, an interpretable whole-brain decoder is not readily achievable with off-the 
shelf statistical methods. As expected, a first difficulty is interpretability: a good whole-brain 
predictor should distinguish regions that are predictive versus those that are not. As a 
counterexample, predictors built from LASSO (a penalized regression approach) results in 
predictive maps with scattered sparkles of coefficients across the brain rather than any 
interpretable clusters or regions (Grosenick, Klingenberg, Katovich, Knutson, & Taylor, 2013). 
This is due to the feature of penalized regression methods to select the few most predictive 
variables instead of clusters of correlated variables. On the other hand, using PCA in conjunction 
with penalized regression models (PCR-LASSO), Wager et al., (2013) was able to provide whole-
brain prediction maps that had clustered coefficients for voxels that delineates which regions are 
positively predictive and which regions are negatively predictive. This natural clustering of 
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coefficients is possible due to the fact that the extracted principle components are correlated with 
neighboring voxels to a similar degree. However, PCR-LASSO does not provide any voxel 
selection measure and hence results in a prediction map where every voxel is given a coefficient 
(in contrast to a thresholded approach as described in this research). In sum, previous approaches 
to whole-brain methods have had difficulty in providing 1) regionally clustered coefficients, and 
2) selectivity of important vs. unimportant regions. 
 A second difficulty is computational efficiency, especially with regards to scaling with 
larger datasets. As mentioned, since neuroimaging data has a substantial number of predictors, 
purely likelihood-based approaches often face the problem of calculating gradients for a large 
number of variables. Adding to the burden, modern models need to be fit multiple if not hundreds 
of times to find the best tuning parameter (e.g., tuning parameter  in LASSO that controls 
variable selectivity). These problems are computationally challenging even in average sized fMRI 
datasets, which is why previous whole-brain predictors used down-sampled images (i.e. coarser) 
with fewer voxels for prediction (e.g., Grosenick et al., 2013; Wager et al., 2013). In contrast to 
purely likelihood-based methods, data-reduction approaches such as PCA can help in immensely 
reducing the number of variables and thereby reducing the model fitting time. However, in larger 
datasets, PCA itself can become a bottleneck for computation time and memory usage as it 
requires computation of the variance-covariance matrix of predictors. These computational costs 
prevent the widespread use of whole-brain methods in neuroimaging, especially for those without 
access to computational clusters. 
Here we propose a novel method, thresholded partial least squares (TPLS), that provide 
interpretable whole-brain predictors that are computationally efficient enough to run on personal 
computers for most datasets. TPLS exploits analytical properties of a modified partial least 
squares algorithm to offer a unique ‘fit-once-tune-later’ approach where the user fits the model 
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only once and then evaluates the best tuning parameter as many times as needed without re-fitting 
the model. This is in stark contrast to most, if not all, modern methods that require re-fitting the 
model for every tuning parameter. Here, we describe the algorithm and showcase its performance 
against other methods in a large neuroimaging dataset. Furthermore, we provide the TPLS 
package online for MATLAB at (https://github.com/sangillee/TPLSm) and for R at 





 TPLS, like many modern regression methods, requires two (training) estimation steps: 
fitting and parameter tuning. In the fitting step, the end goal is to calculate the coefficient and the 
z-statistic of each original variable (e.g., voxel) – similar to the coefficients and t-statistics one 
would get for each variable in multiple regression (Fig. 1-1). In detail, the fitting step first 
extracts the PLS components that maximally explain the covariance between X and Y and then 
regresses Y against the components1. The resulting coefficients and the t-statistics of the 
components are then back-projected into the original variable space so that each voxel would 
have a coefficient and a z-statistic. In the tuning step, the user decides on how many PLS 
components to keep, and how many voxels to keep based on the (researcher chosen) z-statistic 
threshold. For example, using cross-validation, the user may find that a TPLS model that uses the 
first 6 PLS components and retains 50% of the original variables provides the highest out-of-
sample cross-validation performance. Intuitively, the number of PLS components controls the 
 
1 Technically, the calculation of the components and their regression coefficients are done simultaneously 
based on analytical methods without having to perform regression. 
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degree of data reduction while the thresholding level controls variable selection, and, as desired 
here, improves interpretability. 
 
Figure 1 - 1. Schematic of TPLS fitting procedures. 
TPLS model fitting first requires extracting the partial least squares components from the 
predictor matrix and obtaining the components’ back projection maps (PLS weight), their 
regression coefficients, and their z-statistic. Next, the regression coefficients and the z-statistics 
are then back-projected into the voxel space using the weight maps, thereby yielding a whole-
brain coefficient map and a whole-brain z-statistic map, which is then ranked in absolute size to 
determine voxel importance. Finally, the coefficient map is thresholded based on the z-statistic 
rank map to select voxels that are the most important. 
 
The key computational benefit of TPLS comes from the ‘fit-once-tune-later’ feature. The 
user can choose among infinitely many tuning parameter combinations without having to re-fit 
the model, as all the information required is already calculated in a one-time fitting. This is 
because once a TPLS model with m components has been fit, all the models with fewer 
components are also available (i.e., a 1-component, 2-component, …, m-component model). 
Since PLS components are all orthogonal to each other, their regression coefficients do not 
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change based on the components you decide to keep, thereby allowing the user to choose the 
necessary components without re-fitting. 
TPLS falls into the data-reduction category of models, just like PCR-LASSO. However, 
PLS provides two key benefits over PCA. First, PLS computation only requires vector 
multiplications, which are fast and memory efficient, while PCA requires matrix singular value 
decompositions, which grow quadratically with data. Second, PLS components are ordered in 
terms of the explained covariance of X on Y, while PCA components are ordered only in terms of 
variance explained in X. A standing criticism of using PCA for data reduction is that while PCA 
components are great for describing X, they are not necessarily relevant in predicting Y (Lever, 
Krzywinski, & Altman, 2017). 
 
TPLS Algorithm - fitting 
The fitting algorithm for TPLS is a combination of three parts: a modified SIMPLS 
algorithm for PLS (de Jong, 1993), back-projection, and calculation of z-statistics. Fig. 1-2 shows 
the algorithm of TPLS. The one modification that we make to the SIMPLS algorithm is simply in 
normalizing the PLS components to have weighted unit variance (step 4 in Fig. 1-2). This 
facilitates computation of z-statistics later in the algorithm (step 7 in Fig. 1-2). Below we detail 





Figure 1 - 2. Summary of TPLS fitting algorithm.  
Matrices are denoted with bold capital letters, vectors with bold lowercase letters, and scalars 
with non-bolded lowercase letters.  denotes Hadamard product (elementwise multiplication), 




 Back-projection (step 6 in Fig. 1-2). After PLS components have been calculated (up to 
the kth component), we now have a k-component PLS regression model. To improve the 
interpretability of this PLS model, we can convert the PLS regression coefficients into the 
original voxels’ coefficients. Since PLS components are created via weighted sums of original 
variables (i.e., component = weight * variables), one can simply multiply the PLS coefficient by 
the weights first to create back-projected coefficients (i.e., coefficient * component = coefficient 
* weight * variables = back-projected coefficient * variables). This expresses the PLS regression 
in terms of each voxel’s coefficients, which can make the predictor easier to interpret by 
identifying which regions are positively or negatively predictive of behavior and mental states. 
This back-projection is also used in the PCR-LASSO method used by Wager et al. (2013), but 
with PCA components rather than PLS. 
 
 Z-statistic calculation (step 7 in Fig. 1-2). We then calculate the z-statistic of each voxel 
as a measure of variable importance. We start by calculating the heteroscedasticity-consistent 
standard errors (also known as sandwich estimators; White, 1980): 
 
where w denotes the observation weights, and M denotes the variance-covariance matrix for the 
observations. Here is where our modification to the SIMPLS algorithm come in handy. Since the 
PLS components (matrix C) are all orthonormal (in weighted space),  becomes an 
identity matrix, which cancels out the ‘breads’ of the sandwich and leaves us with 
. Since we only need the diagonals of the variance-




where  denotes the squared residual vector. The t-statistics (which is close to a z-statistic with 
sufficient observations) can be then calculated by simple element-wise division of  by . 
Let this vector be denoted z. Then, we back-project the z statistic like the coefficients, and then 




where  denotes the vector that is the row sum of a matrix. This summarizes the fitting 
procedure of TPLS. 
 
TPLS Algorithm - tuning 
After the model fitting is complete, one can retroactively choose the two tuning 
parameters, number of components and the thresholding level, based on cross-validation 
performance. Fig. 1-3 shows an example cross-validation performance surface as a function of 
the number of PLS components and the thresholding level. Because the model does not have to 
be re-fit, researchers can examine the predictor at various thresholding levels and assess the 




Figure 1 - 3. Example TPLS model tuning. 
The left panel shows an example cross-validation performance surface as a function of the two 
tuning parameters of TPLS: number of PLS components (1~25) and proportion of voxels left 
(0~1). The highest CV performance point is marked with a blue dot with the corresponding 
whole-brain predictor shown on the right top panel. Additionally, a model with fewer voxels but 
within 1 standard error of the best model’s performance is indicated with a yellow dot with the 
corresponding map shown on the right middle panel. The right bottom panel is shown to illustrate 
how the number of remaining voxels with coefficients reduce as the proportion of voxels left are 
reduced. 
After the tuning is complete, there is one more step that may be useful in some scenarios: 
post-fitting of bias (intercept). Since some variables are removed during the thresholding stage, 
the intercept should be re-fitted after thresholding. Let’s say that we chose to evaluate a model 
with j components, thresholded at 70% (removing 70% of variables). Then, the coefficients are 
 multiplied by index vector d where  if the voxel’s rank is in the top 30% and 0 
17 
 





 We used a large neuroimaging dataset from Kable et al., (2017) to empirically compare 
TPLS against other extant whole-brain methods (PCR-LASSO and LASSO), and ROI-based 
predictions. We chose this dataset as it was the most readily available large-scale dataset with 
whole-brain coverage that can be used to decode behavior from brain activity levels. Participants 
completed two experimental decision-making tasks: one an intertemporal choice and one a risky 
choice, both very common in the domain of social science (psychology, economics research, e.g., 
Green & Myerson, 2004; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Samuelson, 1937) and their interaction 
with neuroscience (e.g., Jung, Lee, Lerman, & Kable, 2018; Kable & Glimcher, 2007). In 
intertemporal choice, participants made choices between a smaller immediate monetary amount 
of $20 and a larger but delayed monetary amount (e.g., $40 in 30 days). This choice paradigm 
allows one to assess the “time value of money”, hence its name “intertemporal choice”.   In risky 
choice, subjects made choices between a smaller certain monetary amount of $20 and a larger but 
probabilistic monetary amount (e.g., $40 with 60% probability of winning). In both tasks the 
larger amount varied from trial to trial as well as the delay and the risk in each respective task, 
while the smaller monetary option was always fixed at $20. Only the larger monetary option was 
on the screen while the smaller $20 was not; participants made accept/reject choices based on 
whether they’d prefer the larger monetary option on the screen or the smaller monetary option. 
Because the value of one of the options were always constant, Kable et al. (2017) was able to find 
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valuation signals in the brain that correlated with the utility of the varying option that was shown 
on the screen. Based on this result, we sought to create a whole-brain predictor of choice that can 
use these valuation signals to predict whether the participant will accept the option on the screen 
or reject it. Details about removed participants, fMRI image acquisition protocols and 
preprocessing details are provided in the supplemental materials. In total, the dataset gave us a 
total of 61,038 trials (observations) and 184,319 voxels (variables) across 531 task sessions (264 
intertemporal choice sessions, 267 risky choice sessions), which we’ll treat as 531 participants in 
this paper, as our goal is not in making substantive, or comparative, conclusions about the tasks.  
 
Computation comparisons 
 We first assess the scalability of each whole-brain prediction method – LASSO, PCR-
LASSO, and TPLS – by comparing their model fitting time and RAM usage at varying training 
dataset sizes (8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, and 512 participants). In each dataset size (e.g., 8 subjects), 
half of the data was drawn randomly from the risky choice dataset (i.e., 4 subjects) and the other 
was drawn randomly from intertemporal choice dataset. Each model was fitted using 10-fold 
cross-validation (CV). The training data was divided into 10 equal sized blocks and the model 
was fitted on 9 of the blocks and tested on the left-out block. This was repeated 10 times to assess 
cross-validation performance. Then, the tuning parameter that yielded the highest CV 
performance was chosen and used to train the final predictor using all training data. 
For LASSO, we used GLMNET for MATLAB (Friedman, Hastie, & Tibshirani, 2010; 
Qian, Hastie, Friedman, Tibshirani, & Simon, 2013), which is arguably the fastest package for 
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fitting LASSO thanks to its use of regularized path and FORTRAN coding2. We used default 
tuning parameter search, which used 100 lambda values. For PCR-LASSO, we stick with the 
original approach in the Wager et al., (2013) paper by extracting 200 components from all data, 
using 10-fold LASSO logistic regression to find the useful components, and subsequently running 
an unpenalized logistic regression using only the selected components. For TPLS, in each of the 
10 folds, we extracted 25 PLS components and built the TPLS model. Then, during cross-
validation we chose the best number of PLS components and threshold levels. Each whole-brain 
method was fitted 400 times at each dataset size, each time randomly selecting the training data. 
All computations were performed on a large-scale computation cluster at the University of 
Pennsylvania (https://www.med.upenn.edu/cbica/cubic). 
 
Predictive power comparisons 
 For predictive performance, we compared the out-of-sample predictive performances of 
the predictors built above. After the prediction model was fitted using 10-fold cross validation in 
the training data (e.g., 32 subjects), all unused data (e.g., 531-32=499 subjects) served as out-of-
sample testing dataset. Per-subject correlation and area under the ROC curve (AUROC) were 
averaged across the out-of-sample participants to get an average estimate of out-of-sample 
prediction performance. The AUROC of receiver operating characteristic can be understood as 
‘threshold-free accuracy’, ranging from 50% to 100%, as it has been shown to equal the 
probability that the model will accurately give a higher score to a randomly chosen positive case 
than a randomly chosen negative case (Fawcett, 2006). We also added two commonly used ROI-
 
2 The original GLMNET package for MATLAB could not import a dataset size of as large a magnitude as in 
this study because the FORTRAN API with MATLAB was written in 32-bit architecture; we have updated 
the FORTRAN code ourselves to 64-bit architecture to circumvent this issue; the updated package is 
provided here: https://github.com/sangillee/GLMNET64MATLAB 
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based prediction methods to the comparison of predictive power: ROI-average, and ROI-
multivariate. ROI-average is simply taking the average of all voxel activities within a designated 
ROI to make predictions; concordantly, ROI-average does not require fitting a model. ROI-
multivariate, on the other hand, uses the voxels in the ROI to build a predictor. While several 
methods can be used, here we used LASSO to keep make comparisons with our whole-brain 
methods easier. We used ROIs from a meta-analysis by Bartra, McGuire, & Kable (2013), which 
examined around 150 neuroimaging studies on valuation signals and identified two ROIs that 




We compared the interpretability of three whole-brain methods (LASSO, PCR-LASSO, 
TPLS). Using the same fitting procedures as before (10-fold cross-validation), TPLS and PCR-
LASSO was fit using the entirety of the data (531 participants). LASSO, however, was 
computationally too slow to fit using the entire dataset and was only fit with a subsampled 64 
participant dataset. We visually compared the resulting whole-brain predictors and the associated 
areas of the brain to assess the (face/scientific) validity of the identified brain regions. 
 Additionally, we used simulated data to shed further insight into differences in 
interpretability of TPLS and extant neural prediction methods. For simulation, we simulated a 
brain activity signal of a 17x17 voxel grid (total of 289 voxels), of which only a 5x5 grid in the 
center (25 voxels) carried signal that was predictive of Y, while all other voxels were completely 
orthogonal to Y (i.e., noise). We achieved this by first randomly generating 290 variables (289 
voxels + 1 Y) each with 300 observations from a standard normal distribution. Then, we applied 
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symmetric orthogonalization such that all 290 columns are orthogonal to each other. The first 
column of the new matrix was chosen as the predicted variable Y, while the other 289 variables 
became simulations of fMRI noise. To create 25 voxels of predictive voxel signal, we mixed Y 
with 25 of the simulated fMRI noise variables to create 25 signals that were all exactly correlated 
with Y at r = 0.1. Each column was then z-scored to have unit variance. Finally, we placed the 
5x5 signal grid in the center of a 17x17 grid and applied a small amount of 2D Gaussian 
smoothing (sd = 1 voxel) to simulate the inherent smoothness of fMRI signals. In sum, the 
resulting dataset was 300 observations of 17x17 voxel grid predictors with only the center 5x5 
grid being predictive of Y. This simulated dataset was fit by OLS, LASSO, PCR-LASSO (10 





 TPLS shows exceptionally fast model-fitting time compared to the other algorithms 
especially as the dataset size grows larger (Fig. 1-4A). In the largest training dataset size of 512 
people (256 sessions of ITC and 256 sessions of risky choice), TPLS took 2 hours and 10 minutes 
on average to finish 10-fold cross validation training while PCR-LASSO took 2.3 days, which is 
25 times slower than TPLS. LASSO was already taking close to 2 days for 64 participants and 
was too expensive to compute for larger dataset sizes. More importantly however, the differences 
in computation speed grew larger and larger as dataset size increased. When computation time 
was divided by the number of participants, we found that while TPLS takes about the same 
amount of time per-subject (~15 seconds), PCR-LASSO and LASSO shows increasing fitting 
time per-subject as dataset size increased (Fig. 1-4B). This divergence is likely because PCA 
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requires inversion operations on the variance covariance matrix of X, which will quadratically 
increase in size until the number of observations match the number of variables. For LASSO, this 
increase in fitting time is also likely due to calculation of gradients based on matrix operations. 
TPLS, on the other hand, only require vector calculations, for which only the number of variables 
is the dominating factor. The speed of TPLS will prove useful for many neuroimaging studies that 
may examine multiple different behaviors or mental constructs.  In addition, since TPLS only has 




Figure 1 - 4. Computation resource comparison. 
Panels A and B show 10-fold model training times for each algorithm at various dataset sizes 
(total time and total time dived by number of subjects, respectively). The lines show best fitting 
cubic polynomial spline fit. The bottom four panels show RAM usage of each algorithm at 
various dataset sizes. Panel C shows the memory decomposition of each algorithm (memory for 
turning on MATLAB, for loaded data, and for computation). Panel D shows the ratio between 
RAM usage for loading data and RAM usage for computation (colored vs. light grey bar in panel 
C). 
Memory Usage 
 TPLS also uses a very minimal amount of memory compared to other algorithms. (Fig. 1-
4C). We broke down the memory usage into three parts: default RAM for loading the statistical 
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program, RAM for loading the data, and RAM for computing the model from the data. The first 
two is the same across all algorithms as they all need to load the program and the data. The key 
differences come from the differences in RAM usage for model computation. TPLS used the least 
amount of computation memory, followed by LASSO and PCR-LASSO. 
We also found that TPLS’s memory usage was also the most scalable out of all three 
algorithms (Fig. 1-4D). TPLS’s computation RAM usage converges to about the same as RAM 
needed for loading the data (1.75 times -> 0.95 times as dataset size increases). This is likely 
because TPLS requires a mean-centered copy of the data matrix. Should researchers want to, they 
can mean-center the data beforehand and use even less memory for TPLS (this feature is 
available in the provided statistical packages). On the other hand, LASSO’s RAM usage for 
computation ranged from 2.6 times to 2.2 times of data RAM size, while PCR-LASSO’s RAM 
usage was particularly bad as the required RAM for computation increased rapidly as dataset size 
increased (3 times -> 4.9 times). 
 
Prediction Performance 
 TPLS showed the highest or the second-highest predictive performance across all dataset 
sizes (Fig. 1-5). The ROI-average based prediction method, provided the worst prediction 
performances across the board, followed by ROI-multivariate method, which built a predictor 
based on only the voxels within a pre-defined ROI. All three whole-brain predictors provided 
considerably higher predictive performances that increased with dataset sizes. Of the three 
methods we compared, PCR-LASSO provided the worst predictive performances on average, 
except for in the smallest dataset size where LASSO was the worst predictive performance. TPLS 
showed higher predictive performances compared to PCR-LASSO across all dataset sizes and 
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compared to LASSO in small dataset sizes (8 ~16). LASSO showed the highest predictive 
performance in middle dataset sizes (32~64), which would have likely continued to be the highest 
in larger dataset sizes (128~) had it not been for the lengthy computation time. The differences in 
predictive power between the whole-brain methods were not as big, however, as the difference 
between whole-brain methods and ROI-based methods. This illuminates how a whole brain 
predictor can harness more signals across the brain to provide more power. 
 
 
Figure 1 - 5. Out-of-sample prediction of various algorithms. 
Shown above are out-of-sample prediction performances of five algorithms measured via Pearson 
correlation (left) and AUROC (right) for predicting value-based accept/reject choices. The lines 
show best fitting cubic polynomial spline fit. 
 
Predictor Interpretability 
 The resulting whole-brain predictors from various approaches show that different 
methods lead to different predictors and that TPLS provides predictor maps that are easily 
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interpretable (Fig. 1-6). TPLS results in whole-brain predictors with regionally clustered 
coefficients and voxel selection (Fig. 1-6A). This allows researchers to identify key brain regions 
of the predictor. On the other hand, PCR-LASSO approach leads to regionally clustered 
coefficients that is easy to identify but has no voxel selection included (Fig. 1-6B). Different from 
this approach, LASSO predictors were able to select the important predictive voxels from the 
non-predictive ones; however, the resulting coefficients are scattered such that it is difficult to 
pinpoint the regions from which the signals originate (Fig. 1-6C). A single voxel can be very 
difficult to interpret as their positions are not always clearly belonging to a region.  
Apart from the interpretability of the finished predictor, TPLS also offers useful 
information on the relative importance of different brain regions by showing the tradeoff between 
additional thresholding and cross validation performance (Fig. 1-6D & E). Because the 
thresholding level of TPLS model is chosen to maximize cross-validation performance, users can 
experiment with different thresholds to see how much predictive performance is sacrificed when 
fewer regions are recruited into the predictor. Fig. 1-6F~H shows various predictors at different 
thresholds where stringent thresholds (e.g., Fig 1-6H) highlight the more important brain regions 
for prediction. This analysis is possible, as discussed, thanks to TPLS’s fit-once-tune-later 
approach which allows the user to generate and compare as many predictor maps as they want 




Figure 1 - 6. Final predictors of value-based choice.  
Panels A, B, and C show the whole-brain predictor of value-based choice constructed via TPLS, 
PCR-LASSO, and LASSO, respectively. Panel D shows the 10-fold cross validation tuning curve 
for fitting the predictor. Panel E shows the 10-fold cross validation performance of TPLS model 
at various thresholding levels. Panel F, G, and H show the corresponding thresholded predictors 




To compare the whole-brain prediction methods against known “ground-truths”, we 
simulated a 2D brain signal to fit the whole-brain prediction methods (Fig. 1-7). We simulated a 
17x17 voxel grid where only the center 5x5 grid has signal that is predictive of Y (Fig. 1-7A). 
This image was subsequently smoothed to simulate smoothness of fMRI images (Fig. 1-7B). 
When we fit a OLS predictor on this simulated data, it highlighted the canonical problem with 
fMRI images: multicollinearity. OLS predictors resulted in voxel coefficients that were 
tessellating in alternating signs, which makes it impossible to know whether the signal is 
positively predictive or negatively predictive (Fig. 1-7C). LASSO deals with this 
multicollinearity by selecting variables that are the most useful in prediction and removing the 
rest. The resulting predictor, therefore, is very sparse and is difficult to identify the region (Fig. 1-
7D). PCR-LASSO uses PCA data-reduction to create locally smooth predictors that reflect the 
smoothness of fMRI images. However, because there are no voxel selection included, it can be 
difficult identify regions that are predictive from those that are not; this is especially detrimental 
in terms of not removing PCA-based artifacts which can be seen on the predictor (Fig. 1-7E; 
negative coefficients on the edges of the image). Of all these methods, TPLS provides the closest 
resemblance to the ground-truth signal by detecting the positively predictive 5x5 signal grid in the 
center, while eliminating all other voxels from the predictor. These clustered coefficients help the 





Figure 1 - 7. Simulated neuroimaging signal and various predictor fits.  
Panels A shows a simulated 17x17 voxel grid where only the center 5x5 grid has signal that is 
predictive of Y at correlation r = 0.1. Panel B shows the result of a spatial smoothing filter to 
panel A, meant to simulate fMRI image smoothness. Coefficients that are exactly 0 were marked 
as black, while those that are close to 0 are marked as near white. Panel C~F shows regression 
coefficients from OLS regression, LASSO regression, PCR-LASSO regression, and TPLS, 





 With the advent of large-scale fMRI datasets, recent studies have started to develop 
generalized whole-brain predictors to decode mental states or to predict behaviors. Whole brain 
methods have great promise over traditionally used partial-brain methods as they harness more 
signal across the brain, identify unique neural signatures, and illuminate relationships between 
brain regions. However, existing methods of whole-brain predictors are limited in their usability 
due to computation time, memory usage, and, most importantly, interpretability. To this end, we 
here presented a novel method, thresholded partial least squares (TPLS), that can provide 
computationally feasible whole-brain predictors trained via cross validation. 
TPLS exploits analytical properties of partial least squares (PLS) algorithms to 
dramatically reduce model fitting time, use less computational memory, and still provide high 
predictive performance. Compared in a real neuroimaging dataset against extant methods PCR-
LASSO and LASSO, TPLS whole-brain predictors were up to 25 times faster and used as low as 
20% of computation memory than existing alternative methods of whole-brain prediction. 
Furthermore, we found that TPLS was the only scalable method whose per-subject fitting time 
did not increase as the dataset size increased. TPLS method also showed high out-of-sample 
predictive performances that was comparable to other whole-brain predictors. 
In particular, TPLS boasts a unique feature of ‘fit-once-tune-later’, where the model is fit 
only once and the two tuning parameters are chosen after the fact. This is in stark contrast to other 
modern prediction algorithms where models need to be re-fit for every tuning parameter 
combination. Not only does this allow for faster cross-validation, but it also allows researchers to 
explore of various tuning parameters to determine which brain regions are important for 
prediction and can make decisions about the best level of sparsity given the tradeoff between 
parsimony and performance. 
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 We acknowledge that other existing methods such as principal component regression 
(PCR) and LASSO are widely used methods even outside of neuroimaging and all have a large 
number of statistical packages, addendums, and improvements proposed by other researchers. For 
example, because PCA costs huge RAM and computation time for large datasets (as shown in this 
paper as well), there are stochastic variants of PCA that can deal with these problems (Halko, 
Martinsson, & Tropp, 2011). This may reduce the computation time and RAM usage of PCR-
LASSO method shown in this paper, but it still stands that the principal components may not be 
the best suited for prediction and that the resulting whole-brain predictor is less interpretable than 
TPLS methods. Also, for LASSO, there are stochastic gradient descent-based methods that can 
significantly reduce the model fitting time by evaluating the likelihood function on subsamples of 
the data. This, however, has a tradeoff with accuracy of the fit as the gradient calculations are 
approximations. Concordantly, we found that they were both slower and less accurate than TPLS 
model, and we have excluded them from this paper. 
 We see the relationship between whole-brain prediction methods and ROI-based 
prediction methods as similar to that between multivariate regression and pairwise bivariate 
correlation. ROI-based methods may yield insight about how one specific region is related to a 
mental process, but a whole-brain method can yield insight about how multiple ROIs relate to one 
another and contribute to the prediction; they are both important analysis tools that every 
researcher must use to understand the whole picture. Concordantly, we see whole-brain prediction 
as an important analysis tool in coming years of neuroimaging, and we hope that the method that 
we propose here, along with the provided packages, can make the analysis convenient and an 







Neuroimaging data quality control 
Some of the data from Kable et al. (2017) was removed from the analysis due to trivial 
reasons. To keep the number of observations per subject roughly similar, we excluded four pilot 
participants who had more trials than others. Counting both session 1 and session 2 data, we had 
286 sessions worth of data, each with 120 binary choices. From here, we removed 4 intertemporal 
choice sessions and 6 risky choice sessions that had premature termination of scan due to 
technical issues. Additionally, 13 intertemporal choice sessions were removed for having 
extremely unbalanced choices (either accept or reject more than 95% of the time), and 6 sessions 
were removed for having too many missed responses (more than a quarter worth of session). For 
risky choice, 10 sessions were removed for unbalanced choices and 6 sessions were removed for 
too many missed responses. In total, we had 264 sessions worth of data for ITC and 267 sessions 
worth of data for RC. While most participants had both ITC and RC tasks, since several subjects 
only had one task, we decided to treat these two tasks’ sessions as separate participants for our 
analyses. 
 
Image preprocessing and single trial deconvolution 
The Kable et al., (2017) dataset was acquired with a Siemens 3T Trio scanner with a 32-
channel head coil. High-resolution T1-weighted anatomical images were acquired using an 
MPRAGE sequence (T1 = 1100ms; 160 axial slices, 0.9375 x 0.9375 x 1.000 mm; 192 x 256 
matrix). T2*-weighted functional images were acquired using an EPI sequence with 3mm 
isotropic voxels, 64 x 64 matrix, TR = 3,000ms, TE = 25ms, 53 axial slices, 104 volumes. B0 
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fieldmap images were collected for distortion correction (TR = 1270ms, TE = 5 and 7.46ms). The 
images were preprocessed via fMRIPrep. The preprocessing pipeline, in short, performed motion-
correction, slice-time correction, and b0-map unwarping on all runs and registered and resampled 
to a MNI 2mm template. The authors of fMRIPrep has requested the automatically generated 
preprocessing info to be pasted into the manuscript in its unaltered form. They are attached below 
in the next section (fmriprep boilerplate). 
For estimating the activity of each trial, we used beta-series regression (Rissman, 
Gazzaley, & D’Esposito, 2004). The regressors were time-locked to the trial onset period with 
event duration of 0.1 seconds and convolved with a gamma HRF function. The last trial of each 
run was excluded from analysis because the BOLD activity of the last trial was often not 
observed due to the termination of the scan. This gave us 29 regressor of interest per 1 run of 
scan. Additionally, we included the following nuisance regressors which were generated from 
fmriprep: cosine components for high-pass filtering, CSF signal, white matter signal, global 
signal, standard 6 motion regressors, and 6 PCA components from an anatomical mask of white 
matter and CSF (‘a_comp_cor’). After the single trial coefficients were estimated, all images 
were smoothed with a FWHM 5mm gaussian filter. To make analysis easy, we only used the 
voxels that were active for all subjects; this gave us a fairly conservative mask of the brain with 
184,319 voxels. 
Fmriprep boilerplate 
Results included in this manuscript come from preprocessing performed using fMRIPrep 
20.0.5 (Esteban, Markiewicz, et al. (2018); Esteban, Blair, et al. (2018); RRID:SCR_016216), 





Anatomical data preprocessing. A total of 2 T1-weighted (T1w) images were found within the 
input BIDS dataset. All of them were corrected for intensity non-uniformity (INU) with 
N4BiasFieldCorrection (Tustison et al. 2010), distributed with ANTs 2.2.0 (Avants et al. 2008, 
RRID:SCR_004757). The T1w-reference was then skull-stripped with a Nipype implementation 
of the antsBrainExtraction.sh workflow (from ANTs), using OASIS30ANTs as target template. 
Brain tissue segmentation of cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), white-matter (WM) and gray-matter 
(GM) was performed on the brain-extracted T1w using fast (FSL 5.0.9, RRID:SCR_002823, 
Zhang, Brady, and Smith 2001). A T1w-reference map was computed after registration of 2 T1w 
images (after INU-correction) using mri_robust_template (FreeSurfer 6.0.1, Reuter, Rosas, and 
Fischl 2010). Volume-based spatial normalization to one standard space 
(MNI152NLin2009cAsym) was performed through nonlinear registration with antsRegistration 
(ANTs 2.2.0), using brain-extracted versions of both T1w reference and the T1w template. The 
following template was selected for spatial normalization: ICBM 152 Nonlinear Asymmetrical 
template version 2009c [Fonov et al. (2009), RRID:SCR_008796; TemplateFlow ID: 
MNI152NLin2009cAsym], 
 
Functional data preprocessing. For each of the 18 BOLD runs found per subject (across all tasks 
and sessions), the following preprocessing was performed. First, a reference volume and its skull-
stripped version were generated using a custom methodology of fMRIPrep. A B0-nonuniformity 
map (or fieldmap) was estimated based on a phase-difference map calculated with a dual-echo 
GRE (gradient-recall echo) sequence, processed with a custom workflow of SDCFlows inspired 
by the epidewarp.fsl script and further improvements in HCP Pipelines (Glasser et al. 2013). The 
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fieldmap was then co-registered to the target EPI (echo-planar imaging) reference run and 
converted to a displacements field map (amenable to registration tools such as ANTs) with FSL’s 
fugue and other SDCflows tools. Based on the estimated susceptibility distortion, a corrected EPI 
(echo-planar imaging) reference was calculated for a more accurate co-registration with the 
anatomical reference. The BOLD reference was then co-registered to the T1w reference using 
flirt (FSL 5.0.9, Jenkinson and Smith 2001) with the boundary-based registration (Greve and 
Fischl 2009) cost-function. Co-registration was configured with nine degrees of freedom to 
account for distortions remaining in the BOLD reference. Head-motion parameters with respect 
to the BOLD reference (transformation matrices, and six corresponding rotation and translation 
parameters) are estimated before any spatiotemporal filtering using mcflirt (FSL 5.0.9, Jenkinson 
et al. 2002). BOLD runs were slice-time corrected using 3dTshift from AFNI 20160207 (Cox and 
Hyde 1997, RRID:SCR_005927). The BOLD time-series (including slice-timing correction when 
applied) were resampled onto their original, native space by applying a single, composite 
transform to correct for head-motion and susceptibility distortions. These resampled BOLD time-
series will be referred to as preprocessed BOLD in original space, or just preprocessed BOLD. 
The BOLD time-series were resampled into standard space, generating a preprocessed BOLD run 
in MNI152NLin2009cAsym space. First, a reference volume and its skull-stripped version were 
generated using a custom methodology of fMRIPrep. Several confounding time-series were 
calculated based on the preprocessed BOLD: framewise displacement (FD), DVARS and three 
region-wise global signals. FD and DVARS are calculated for each functional run, both using 
their implementations in Nipype (following the definitions by Power et al. 2014). The three 
global signals are extracted within the CSF, the WM, and the whole-brain masks. Additionally, a 
set of physiological regressors were extracted to allow for component-based noise correction 
(CompCor, Behzadi et al. 2007). Principal components are estimated after high-pass filtering the 
preprocessed BOLD time-series (using a discrete cosine filter with 128s cut-off) for the two 
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CompCor variants: temporal (tCompCor) and anatomical (aCompCor). tCompCor components 
are then calculated from the top 5% variable voxels within a mask covering the subcortical 
regions. This subcortical mask is obtained by heavily eroding the brain mask, which ensures it 
does not include cortical GM regions. For aCompCor, components are calculated within the 
intersection of the aforementioned mask and the union of CSF and WM masks calculated in T1w 
space, after their projection to the native space of each functional run (using the inverse BOLD-
to-T1w transformation). Components are also calculated separately within the WM and CSF 
masks. For each CompCor decomposition, the k components with the largest singular values are 
retained, such that the retained components’ time series are sufficient to explain 50 percent of 
variance across the nuisance mask (CSF, WM, combined, or temporal). The remaining 
components are dropped from consideration. The head-motion estimates calculated in the 
correction step were also placed within the corresponding confounds file. The confound time 
series derived from head motion estimates and global signals were expanded with the inclusion of 
temporal derivatives and quadratic terms for each (Satterthwaite et al. 2013). Frames that 
exceeded a threshold of 0.5 mm FD or 1.5 standardised DVARS were annotated as motion 
outliers. All resamplings can be performed with a single interpolation step by composing all the 
pertinent transformations (i.e. head-motion transform matrices, susceptibility distortion correction 
when available, and co-registrations to anatomical and output spaces). Gridded (volumetric) 
resamplings were performed using antsApplyTransforms (ANTs), configured with Lanczos 
interpolation to minimize the smoothing effects of other kernels (Lanczos 1964). Non-gridded 






CHAPTER 3 – Neural Correlates of Value Are Intrinsically History Dependent 
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Abstract 
A central finding in decision neuroscience is that blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) activity 
in several regions, including ventral striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex, is correlated 
with the subjective value of the option being considered, and that BOLD activity in these regions 
can predict choices out of sample, even at the population-level. Here we show, across two 
different decision-making tasks in a large sample of subjects, that these BOLD value-correlates 
are intrinsically negatively history dependent. If the subjective value of the previous offer was 
high, the signal on the current trial will be lower, and vice versa. This kind of history dependency 
is distinct from previously described adaptation or repetition suppression effects, but instead is of 
the form predicted by theories of efficient coding such as time-dependent cortical normalization. 
In terms of practical application, since value-based choice behavior does not exhibit the same 
history dependence, neural prediction studies may exhibit systematic attribution errors without 
accounting for history effects. The data-driven, interpretable, whole-brain prediction approach we 











Across hundreds of studies, researchers have consistently found neural correlates of 
subjective value for various commodities (e.g., taste, food, money, drugs, pictures of attractive 
faces and places, social approval, joy out of others misfortune, viewing of a soccer goal, 
etc.(Breiter et al., 1997; Cloutier, Heatherton, Whalen, & Kelley, 2008; Izuma, Saito, & Sadato, 
2010; Knutson, Adams, Fong, & Hommer, 2001; Kringelbach, O’Doherty, Rolls, & Andrews, 
2003; McLean et al., 2009; O’Doherty  Deichmann, R, Critchley, HD, Dolan, RJ, 2002; Pegors, 
Kable, Chatterjee, & Epstein, 2015; H. Takahashi et al., 2009)). Meta-analysis has revealed 
reliable correlates of subjective value across these studies in the ventral striatum (VS) and the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC)(Bartra et al., 2013). Such brain region overlap suggests 
that there may be a common neural valuation system that operates across all of the tested 
commodities: a domain-general signal that increases and decreases with subjective value.  
Under the assumption that these regions encode subjective value, several studies have 
shown that activity in VS or vmPFC can predict that individual’s future choices (Knutson, Scott, 
Wimmer, Prelec, & Loewenstein, 2007; I. Levy et al., 2011; Smith et al., 2014; Tusche, Bode, & 
Haynes, 2010). Subsequently, and perhaps more surprisingly, several studies have used neural 
signals from these regions to predict the real-world behavior of other individuals responding to 
the same stimuli (Berns & Moore, 2012; Falk, Berkman, & Lieberman, 2012; Genevsky & 
Knutson, 2015; Genevsky, Yoon, & Knutson, 2017; Karmarkar et al., 2015; Scholz et al., 2017; 
Venkatraman et al., 2014). These studies employed a simple approach of using average signals 
from VS or vmPFC, yet they predicted behavior over and above more traditional non-brain 
measures (Berns & Moore, 2012; Falk et al., 2012; Genevsky & Knutson, 2015; Genevsky et al., 
2017; Scholz et al., 2017; Venkatraman et al., 2014). For example, Berns and Moore (2012)  
showed that VS activity of adolescents listening to unknown artists’ songs significantly predicted 
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future album sales while their self-report ratings did not; Falk, Berkman & Lieberman (2012) 
showed that neural activity in vmPFC while watching anti-smoking ads predicted the population-
level success of those ads while self-report judgments did not; Venkatraman et al. (2014) showed 
that activity in VS predicted market-level response to advertising beyond traditional measures; 
and Genevsky, Yoon, and Knutson (2017) showed that VS measurements from a small sample 
predicted the market-level outcome of crowdfunding projects while behavioral measures did not.  
 However, despite these successes in the applied domain, a basic question remains: what 
quantity, exactly, is being tracked by activity in regions, such as VS and vmPFC, that exhibit 
value correlates? Unlike theoretic utility, which is unbounded, neural signals of value are 
constrained by physiological limits. Hence, in order to efficiently encode values for small stakes 
decisions (e.g., $1 vs. $2) as well as for large stakes decisions (e.g., 1 million vs. 2 million), the 
brain needs to adapt its sensitivity to the currently relevant range of values. Previous studies have 
shown that in blocks with large value options, neural value signals, whether measured with fMRI 
or single neuron recordings, exhibit lower sensitivity in order to represent a wide range of values, 
while in blocks with only smaller value options, neural value signals exhibit higher sensitivity to 
optimally represent the narrow range of values (Cai & Padoa-Schioppa, 2012; Cox & Kable, 
2014; Kobayashi, Pinto de Carvalho, & Schultz, 2010; Padoa-Schioppa, 2009). One way to 
achieve these block-wise changes in sensitivity would be for activity to adjust to recent history in 
a trial-by-trial manner: specifically, activity would be elevated if the previous trial’s value was 
low and it would be depressed if the previous trial’s value was high. Hence, the value signal 
would not only be positively correlated with the value offered on the current trial, but also 
negatively correlated with values offered on immediate past trials. Such history dependence is 
further predicted by theories such as time-dependent cortical normalization (Tymula & Glimcher, 
2016). However, though there is some evidence for such trial-by-trial history dependence in 
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single neurons in the orbitofrontal cortex (Padoa-Schioppa, 2009), whether history dependence is 
a general feature of value coding, whether it is present in the BOLD signal, and how the history 
dependence in different brain regions compares to that in behavior is unknown. 
 Here, we show that neural correlates of value measured with fMRI are history dependent. 
Using a large imaging dataset of intertemporal choice and risky choice, we show, separately 
across both tasks, that neural signals that are positively correlated with the value of the offer on 
the current trial are also negatively correlated with the recent offer values on past trials. We also 
show that this history dependency cannot be explained by well-known fMRI adaptation or 
repetition suppression effects (Barron, Dolan, & Behrens, 2013; Grill-Spector, Henson, & Martin, 
2006; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001; Segaert, Weber, de Lange, Petersson, & Hagoort, 2013). In 
contrast to the history dependency in neural activity, we find no evidence that choices are 
influenced by the recent offer values on past trials. Given this discrepancy, we then build an 
interpretable whole-brain predictor of choice, as a data-driven method of searching for neural 
signals of value without history dependency. However, in examining the structure of the whole 
brain predictor, we find that all positively weighted regions show history dependency and the 
negatively weighted regions served to subtract out these history effects. In terms of basic 
neuroscience, these results show that BOLD value correlates are intrinsically history dependent, 
in a trial-by-trial manner that can account for the range normalization observed in these signals 
over longer timescales. In terms of practical application, these results show that neural prediction 
studies that use univariate signals from regions of interest will make systematic errors without 
accounting for these history effects; the whole-brain multivariate methods we use here provides 






We used a dataset from Kable et al. (2017)(Kable, Caulfield, Falcone, McConnell, 
Bernardo, Parthasarathi, Cooper, Ashare, Audrain-McGovern, Hornik, et al., 2017). The purpose 
of their study was to examine the effect of commercial cognitive training software on brain 
activity during decision making tasks. Participants completed two sessions of economic decision-
making tasks with 10 weeks in between. In each session, they completed 4 runs each of 
intertemporal choice (ITC) and risky choice (RC) tasks while being scanned. Each run had 30 
binary choices. In ITC, the choices were between a smaller immediate reward of $20 today and a 
larger later reward (e.g., $30 in 7 days); in RC, they were between a smaller certain reward of $20 
and a larger probabilistic reward (e.g., $40 with 60% chance). In both tasks, the smaller amount 
was always $20, while the larger option varied in amount and delay/probability. The original 
study reported no difference in decision-making or brain activity after 10 weeks. Hence, in the 
current paper, we combine both session 1 and session 2 datasets. The data that support the 
findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request. 
Of the 160 participants that completed session 1, we excluded those with missing runs (n 
= 6), head movement (any run with >5% of mean image displacements greater than 0.5mm; n = 
3), more than 3 missing trials per run for two or more runs (n = 2), or revealed study design (n = 
1, and one subject expressed awareness of their experimental condition, i.e. cognitive training vs. 
control). Of the remaining 148, 114 also completed session 2, from which we also excluded those 
with missing runs (n = 3), head movement (n = 2), or too many missing trials (n = 2). This left us 
with 148 participants’ session 1 data and 107 participants’ session 2 data. To ensure the reliability 
of our choice models, we excluded sessions with extremely one-sided choices (less than 10 trials 
of either choice type). This removed 20 sessions in ITC and 14 sessions in RC. In total, our final 
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dataset was 235 sessions of ITC data and 241 sessions of RC data across 147 participants and 2 
sessions (1 participant’s data was completely removed due to one-sided choices in both tasks). 
 
fMRI image acquisition, preprocessing 
The brain images were collected with a Siemens 3T Trio scanner with a 32-channel head 
coil. T1-weighted anatomical images were acquired using an MPRAGE sequence (T1 = 1100ms, 
160 axial slices, 0.9375 x 0.9375 x 1.000 mm, 192 x 256 matrix). T2*-weighted functional 
images were acquired with an EPI sequence with 3mm isotropic voxels (TR = 3,000ms, TE = 
25ms, 53 axial slices, 64 x 64 matrix, 104 volumes). B0 images were collected for unwarping (TR 
= 1270ms, TE 1 = 5.0ms, TE 2 = 7.46ms). Images were preprocessed with FSL: skull stripped 
with BET (Brain Extraction Tool), motion corrected with MCFLIRT (Linear Image Restoration 
Tool with Motion Correction), spatially smoothed (FWHM 9mm Gaussian Kernel), high pass 




Behaviorally, we test if people’s choices are affected by the subjective value of previous 
trials’ offers using choice modeling. In each of the two tasks separately, we modeled the logit of 
each trial’s choice probability as a weighted sum of current and previous trials’ subjective values, 
which were simultaneously estimated with a utility function. While researchers often use 
parametric utility models, there is a myriad of established models for ITC and RC (e.g., 
exponential (Samuelson, 1937), hyperbolic (Herrnstein, 1981), generalized hyperbolic (Green, 
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Fry, & Myerson, 1994), quasi-hyperbolic (Laibson, 1997); expected utility theory (Morgenstern 
& Von Neumann, 1953), prospect theory models (Goldstein & Einhorn, 1987; Prelec, 1998; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), mean variance models(Markowitz, 1959; Weber, Shafir, & Blais, 
2004)). Furthermore, using a particular parametric formula assumes that all participants have the 
same utility function. Hence, instead, we fitted a data-driven utility model via cubic Bezier 
splines (Lee, Glaze, Bradlow, & Kable, 2019), which can approximate any of the established 
utility models, but can also fit unconventional forms as well. (We note, though, that using other 
established utility models, such as hyperbolic discounting and power utility functions, does not 
change our substantive conclusions.) 
The model form is shown below. Let Yt denote the choice at each trial such that Yt = 1 is 
choosing the larger reward and Yt = 0 is choosing the smaller $20 at trial t. We fit the following 
model to ITC and RC data for each session (120 choices) using MLE: 
 
 
CBS(delayt) and CBS(probabilityt) shown above denote the discounting function constructed with 
Cubic Bezier Splines that take delay or probability as input and outputs a discounting factor 
between 0 and 1. The first n trials of each run were removed as they have no lagged variables. 
Because we estimate the overall scale of the coefficients (βscale), the coefficient of the current 
subjective value ( ) was fixed at 1. The coefficients of the lagged subjective values ( ) 
were constrained between -1 and 1. We fitted two models: lag 4 and lag 0. The lag 4 model was 
fitted to assess if there was any significant influence of past trials. Upon concluding that there 
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was not, the lag 0 model was fitted to calculate each trial’s subjective value (eq. 2), which were in 
turn supplied to the fMRI GLM analyses (see below). 
 
fMRI Analyses – GLM 
 Parallel to the behavioral analysis, we test if neural signals are affected by the subjective 
value of past trials’ offers; separately for both tasks, we regressed each voxel’s activity against 
the intercept, the subjective value (SV) of the offer on the current trial and on each of the 
previous four trials. To remove their effects from the regression, one nuisance regressor modeled 
the average activity of the first four trials (trials that have no lagged values). The lagged SV 
regressors were orthogonalized with respect to the intercept and previous lags (e.g., a lag2 
regressor was orthogonalized with respect to the average, lag0, and lag1 regressors). All 
regressors were time-locked to the trial onset with event duration of 0.1 seconds and convolved 
with a gamma hemodynamic response function. We used FSL’s FLAME (FMRIB’s Local 
Analysis of Mixed Effects) model to obtain an average coefficient of each session for each task. 
Then we tested for brain regions that have significant activity at the group level by performing 
permutation tests across all the sessions (235 sessions for ITC, 241 sessions for RC). We used a 
threshold of p = .01 for each lag (0 ~ 4) so that the Bonferroni familywise error rate would be p = 
.05 for each task. 
 To thoroughly test whether regions where activity was correlated with the current offer’s 
SV are also influenced by the SV of previous trials’ offers, we examined the lagged regressor 
coefficients in three different ways. First, we created ROIs by choosing voxels from the Bartra et 
al. meta-analysis (Bartra et al., 2013) that have significant effect of SV in both of our tasks. Using 
these ROIs for vmPFC and VS, we estimated their average lagged coefficients. Second, we 
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defined spherical ROIs (radius = 2 voxels) around each peak for the effect of the current trial’s 
SV and estimated the average lagged coefficients in these ROIs. Peaks were determined as the 
local maxima of permutation t-stats within a radius of sqrt(12) voxels (64 ROIs for ITC and 75 
ROIs for RC). Last, we examined the raw distribution of lag1 and lag2 coefficients for all voxels 
where activity was significantly correlated with the current trial’s SV at the whole-brain level 
from the aforementioned permutation tests. 
 
fMRI Analyses – Repetition Suppression 
To formally test repetition suppression, we ran 5 GLM analyses each with a different 
model for repetition suppression. Each GLM included an average activity regressor for all trials, a 
subjective value regressor, and a distance measure between current and last trial. We employed 5 
different distance measures to assess all possible scenarios of repetition suppression: 1) absolute 
distance between current and previous trial’s subjective value, 2) absolute distance between the 
current and previous trial’s reward amount, 3) absolute distance between the current and previous 
trial’s delay/probability, 4) “cityblock” distance between current and last trial’s offer in combined 
attribute space (that is, amount and delay/probability, the additive combination of 2 and 3), and 5) 
Euclidean distance between current and last trial’s offer in combined attribute space. Each trial’s 
subjective value was calculated using the logit model specified in eq (1) and (2) with lag = 0. 
Each trial’s attribute regressors (i.e., amount, delay/probability) were normalized to [0 1] range 
(amount was divided by 85, which is the maximum amount; delay was divided by 180 which was 
the maximum delay). For each combination of task and GLM model, we tested for significant 
regions of repetition suppression by permutation testing the individual coefficients at the group-
level with threshold-free cluster enhancement and two-tailed tests p < .05. 
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fMRI Analyses – MVPA 
We combined fMRI data across subjects and the two tasks to build a generalized 
predictor of choice. First, we estimated the fMRI activity of each single trial via the LS-S (Least 
Squares-Separate) method(Turner, 2010). This involved running a separate GLM for each trial 
with two regressors: one regressor for the trial of interest and one nuisance regressor modeling 
the average activity of all other trials. The last trial of each run was excluded from this analysis 
because the scan was often terminated before the onset of blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) 
activity of this trial. To downplay the role of noisy estimates, we used the t-stats instead of the 
raw coefficients. The t-stats were registered to a standard MNI 3mm template before further 
analysis. Then, we removed voxels that had .4 or less prior probability of being grey matter 
(FSL’s grey matter prior). 
We used principle component logistic regression with bootstrap thresholding to create an 
interpretable whole-brain predictor (PCLR-bootstrap). PCLR-bootstrap starts with principle 
component decomposition(Halko et al., 2011) of the predictor matrix, which gives two matrices: 
the components and their loadings (X = TW, where T is component and W is loadings). The 
components are then used as predictors in logistic regression (logit(Y=1) = b0 + Tb̂). The 
resulting coefficients are then projected back into the brain space by multiplying them with their 
respective loadings (β = Wb̂). This process was repeated 5000 times with bootstrapped trials to 
obtain the p-value of each voxel, which was used to threshold the whole-brain map. The resulting 
sparse whole-brain coefficient predictor can be conveniently used by simply multiplying it to any 
new brain image to yield a prediction score (i.e., score = Xβ). 
In order to find the best predictive whole-brain map, we performed a grid search of two 
PCLR-bootstrap tuning parameters while performing cross validation: the number of principle 
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components (400, 600, 800, 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500), and p-value threshold (100 ~ 10-2 in 50 log 
intervals). For each combination of the two parameters, we performed leave-one-subject-out cross 
validation across 147 participants. The predictor was trained with 146 participants’ data 
(combined across tasks and sessions) and predicted the left-out participant’s data. Out-of-sample 
prediction performance was measured via the area under the receiver operating characteristic 
curve (AUROC). The mean of these 147 AUROC scores were used to guide the selection of the 
best number of principle components and p-value. While the best predictive map was constructed 
with 1500 principal components with threshold at p = 0.324, we found that the particular choice 
of these two parameters were not too important since the parameter combination with the lowest 
LOOCV performance was only lower by 1% AUROC. For comparison, we also measured the 
cross-validation AUROC of Bartra et al. ROI predictors which is the mean activity within the 
ROI. 
In order to interpret the whole-brain predictor, we lowered the p-value threshold to .01 so that we 
can focus on the most significant voxels. This led to 44 spatially distinct clusters. One way to 
understand the whole-brain predictor is to think of it as a sum of these 44 regions’ signals, which, 
in turn, is the weighted sum of each region’s voxels’ activity according to their assigned weight 
maps from the whole-brain predictor. To assess the relationship between these 44 signals, we 
performed hierarchical clustering analysis using the correlation between the regions’ signal as the 
distance metric. Pairwise correlation between the 44 signals were used as a distance metric (1 – 
Pearson r) and average distance between clusters were used to calculate the hierarchical 






 We examined three aspects of history dependencies in valuation. First, in behavioral data, 
we examined if choices are affected by the subjective value of the offers on previous trials, in 
addition to the subjective value of the current offer. Then, in the neural domain, we examined if 
BOLD activity in brain regions where the signal is correlated with the subjective value of the 
current offer is also correlated with the subjective value of previous trials’ offers. As summarized 
in Figure 2-1a, we found that choices were not affected by the subjective value of the offers on 
previous trials, but neural activity was affected negatively by them. In light of this potential 
difference in history-dependence between neural signals and behavior, we built a whole-brain 
choice predictor to see how neural data can be used to predict behavioral choices. 
Participants completed two economic decision-making tasks while being scanned 
(Figure 2-1b). In ITC, participants made binary choices between a delayed larger monetary 
outcome, which was shown on the screen, versus an immediate smaller monetary outcome of $20 
(fixed across all trials), which was not shown on the screen. In RC, participants made binary 
choices between a risky larger monetary outcome, which was shown on the screen, versus a 
certain smaller monetary outcome of $20 (fixed across all trials), which was not shown on the 
screen. Participants used a button pad to indicate whether they would accept the larger (but 
delayed or risky) option on the screen or to reject that offer and receive the smaller (but 





Figure 2 - 1. Summaries of regression analyses (a), summary of task (b), and lagged 
subjective value regression from behavioral data (c). 
Panel (a) above shows a simplified schematic of the findings in regression analyses. We found 
that neural activity in value regions was not only positively correlated with subjective value 
estimates of the current trial’s offer but also negatively correlated with subjective value estimates 
of the past trials’ offers. On the other hand, we found no evidence that choice on the current trial 
was influenced by subjective value of the past trials. Panel (b) below shows a simplified 
schematic of the two tasks intertemporal choice (ITC) and risky choice (RC). In each task, 
participants saw a larger monetary option on the screen (delayed/risky) which they could either 
accept or reject. Panel (c) is the median coefficient estimates from a lag 4 behavioral model (eq. 
1) fitted for 235 ITC sessions and 241 RC sessions. The error bars are standard errors of the 
median calculated via bootstrap. The coefficient of the subjective value (lag0) was fixed at 1, and 
was not estimated, but is plotted to show relative contribution of each variable. Two-tailed sign-
rank tests were performed to test the significance at each lag. Multiple comparison was corrected 
at the task level using Holm-Bonferroni correction. No lags were significantly different from zero 





Choice is not affected by the value of previous trials’ offers 
 Behaviorally, we found that choices are not significantly affected by the subjective value 
of the previous trials’ offers. We used logistic regression with lagged subjective values to see if 
the subjective values of the offers on the past 4 trials have any influence on the current choice. As 
shown in Figure 2-1c, there is very little influence of past trials’ subjective values. To maximize 
power, we also fitted a simpler model with only the current and immediately previous trials’ 
subjective values. Even then, however, the coefficient of the previous trial’s subjective value was 
not significantly different from zero at the group level and was tightly distributed around zero 
(sign-rank z = -0.88, p = 0.38 for ITC; z = 0.10, p = 0.92 for RC). 
 
Neural correlates of value are affected by the value of previous trials’ offers 
 Neural analyses, on the other hand, revealed many areas where activity is significantly 
influenced by the subjective value of previous trials’ offers (Figure 2-2). We found that activity 
in many regions is significantly positively correlated with the current trial’s subjective value but 
also negatively correlated with the last trial’s subjective value. No negative correlations were 
found for the current trial’s value and no positive correlations were found for the past trials’ 
value. VS and vmPFC were among the regions showing overlapping positive effects of the 




Figure 2 - 2. t-statistics from whole-brain permutation tests for GLM lagged coefficients. 
For each lag (0 ~ 4), we performed two-tailed permutation tests at p = .01 level to find regions 
that were significantly correlated with each lagged regressor. This corrects for multiple 
comparisons for each task at p = .05 (Bonferroni correction). No activity was significant beyond 
lag 2. 
Region of interest analyses further confirm the prevalence of lagged value effects. First, 
we created ROIs for VS and vmPFC by selecting the voxels that showed significant subjective 
value effects in both of our tasks (i.e., the conjunction of lag 0 maps from Figure 2-2) within the 
regions identified by the Bartra et al. (2013) meta-analysis. We obtained the mean coefficients 
within each of the two ROIs and then tested if they were significantly different from zero at the 
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group-level (Figure 2-3). In both ROIs and in both tasks, we found that activity was largely 
negatively correlated with previous trials’ values with diminishing effect as the lags increase. 
 
Figure 2 - 3. Lagged subjective value coefficients from conjunction mask with Bartra et al. 
(2013) ROIs. 
ROIs were created by a three-way conjunction between Bartra et al. masks and permutation tested 
maps for subjective value in our two tasks. Average coefficient was calculated by taking the 
median of all coefficients within the ROI. Above plot shows the median of these coefficients 
across all sessions (235 ITC sessions and 241 RC sessions). The error bars are standard errors of 
the median calculated via bootstrap. The left panels show the lagged coefficients of ITC and the 
right panels show that of RC. The top panels show the results from the ventral striatum (VS) ROI 
and the bottom panels show that from the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) ROI. All 
significance testing was performed via two-tailed sign-rank tests. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < 
.001. 
We found similar results across 64 ROIs in ITC and 75 ROIs in RC defined based on the 
peak positive effects of the current trial’s subjective value (Figure 2-4). Across both tasks, an 
overwhelming majority of the ROIs had negative lag1 and lag2 coefficients, suggesting that 
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regions with a positive effect of subjective value on the current trial tend to have a negative 
history effect. We also corroborated these results at the voxel level by finding that most of the 
voxels showing a significant correlation with subjective value on the current trial have negative 
lag 1 and lag 2 coefficients (Figure 2-4). 
 
 
Neural history effects are distinct from repetition suppression 
Previous fMRI studies have identified repetition suppression effects – reduced activation 
for repeated stimuli – across a wide variety of different stimuli and brain regions, including in 
vmPFC. The history dependency we observe in neural value correlates is similar to repetition 
suppression, in that both involve an influence of the previous trial’s stimulus on the current trial’s 
neural response. However, the history dependency described above differs from repetition 
suppression in that it is independent of the current trial’s stimulus, while repetition suppression 
depends critically on the similarity between the current and previous trial’s stimulus. For 
example, the history dependency described above would predict the activity on the current trial is 
reduced when the previous trial’s offer value is high, regardless of the current trial’s offer, while 
repetition suppression would predict that activity on the current trial is reduced when the previous 
trial’s offer value is high, if the current trial’s offer value is also high. Given that our trials are 
randomly ordered, the similarity or distance between the current and last trial’s offer should be 






Figure 2 - 4. Distribution of lagged coefficients for SV peak ROIs and SV voxels. 
There were 64 ROIs for ITC and 75 ROIs for RC (each represented as a dot on the upper panel) 
that were determined by constructing a spherical ROI around the peak voxels of lag 0 t-stat map 
from figure 3 (i.e., voxels that were shown to be significantly positively correlated with current 
trial’s value at the whole-brain level). The mean coefficient within each ROI was taken as an 
average measure for each session, and the median of these measures across all sessions are 
plotted above. Bottom panel is Scatterplot of median lag 1 and lag 2 coefficients for voxels that 
show significant correlation with subjective value of current (lag0) trial. Each dot is a single 




To show that the history dependency we describe above cannot be accounted for by 
repetition suppression, we systematically examined five different forms of similarity or distance 
between the current and previous trials’ offers, involving the subjective value of the offers, the 
attribute values (amount or delay/probability) of the offers, or combinations of the attribute values 
(assuming additive/”cityblock” or Euclidean distance in two-dimensional attribute space). We 
found no significant effects of value distance in the brain, and the only distance effects that were 
consistent across the two tasks were for combined attribute distance in the intraparietal sulcus 
(Figure 2-5). Critically, none of the distance effects were significant in VS or vmPFC. Even 
when we used the Bartra ROIs for VS and vmPFC, none of the regions showed significant 
positive activities for any of the 5 different regressors across both ITC and RC. 
 
Whole-brain neural predictor cancels out the history signal in neural data 
 Given the discrepancy between strong history effects in neural data but no history effect 
in behavioral data, we used a data-driven approach to search for any history-independent value 
signals in the brain. Since choice has no history effects, building a whole-brain predictor of 
choice should capitalize on any neural signals of value without history effects, if such signals 
exist. Through a PCLR-bootstrap procedure (Figure 2-6), we created a whole-brain predictor of 
choice with LOOCV performance (as measured by area under the ROC curve: AUROC) that 





Figure 2 - 5. Significant regions for repetition suppression regressors in the brain. 
Each row corresponds to a different model of repetition suppression. The left column shows 
significant regions for intertemporal choice dataset and the right column shows significant 
regions for risky choice dataset. Result for each cell is tested with permutation testing with 
threshold-free cluster enhancement two-tailed t-tests at p < .05. All found results were positive 





Figure 2 - 6. Flowchart of PCLR-bootstrap (a), resulting whole-brain predictor (b), and 
cross-validation performance (c). 
Top panel (a) shows the flowchart of PCLR-bootstrap. The original data are composed of single-
trial images of the brain and their corresponding behaviors (choices). The single-trial images are 
then decomposed into principle components, which in turn are used as predictors in a logistic 
regression. The coefficients of these components, when multiplied with their respective loadings, 
yield a whole-brain map. The logistic regression is repeated with bootstrapped samples in order to 
calculate a bootstrap p-value for each voxel, which are then used to threshold the whole-brain 
prediction map. Panel (b) shows the whole-brain predictor created with PCLR-bootstrap, and 
panel (c) shows its prediction performance compared with mask-based approaches. All three 
prediction methods yielded performance significantly higher than 50% (two-tailed sign-rank p < 
.001). The solid line in the middle of the box shows the median, with the shaded thicker line 
showing 95% confidence interval of the median. The boxes show the interquartile range and the 
whiskers show the range of data (or 1.5x the interquartile range in case of outliers). The cross 




 A hierarchical clustering analysis of the whole-brain predictor (with more stringent 
thresholding at p < .01) revealed two distinct groups of regions that contribute unique signals to 
the whole-brain predictor (Figure 2-7). We obtained the contribution of each of the 44 
contiguous regions to the prediction by calculating the weighted sum of the voxels according to 
the whole-brain predictor coefficients on every trial. Then the pairwise correlation between these 
44 signals across all trials was used to calculate a hierarchical clustering solution. The cophenetic 
correlation coefficient (ranging from 0 to 1) that measures the quality of the clustering result was 
very high at 0.98. Furthermore, the first division into two clusters coincides perfectly with 
whether a region was assigned a negative or a positive weight in the whole-brain predictor. This 
result could not be achieved if the positive and negative regions were both encoding subjective 
value but with different signs, as multiplying the negative coefficients to negative subjective 
value would have made it positively correlated with subjective value. This result suggests that the 
whole-brain predictor can be thought of as the difference between two signals: the signal carried 
by the positively weighted regions minus the signal carried by the negatively-weighted regions. 




Figure 2 - 7. Hierarchical clustering analysis of whole-brain predictor thresholded at p < 
.01. 
Shown on the left is a dendrogram that shows the clustering solution and marks the average 
correlation between groups by the height at which the branch bifurcates. The right shows the 
corresponding regions in each of the two groups. All positive regions ended up in one group 
(above) while all negative regions ended up in the other (below). 
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 Further examination revealed that the whole-brain predictor works by using the signal in 
the negatively-weighted group to subtract out the history effects in the signal of the positively-
weighted group. To see how the signals are being combined, we examined the average lagged 
coefficients of the positively-weighted group, the negatively-weighted group, and the two groups 
combined (Figure 2-8). We found that the signals from the positively-weighted group were quite 
similar to the signals from the negatively-weighted group; the only difference was relative 
strength of the subjective value signal compared to the history signal. In the positively-weighted 
group, the subjective value of the current offer was the strongest signal, whereas in the 
negatively-weighted group, the subjective value signal from the current trial was about the same 
size as the lagged signal from one trial back or even smaller. Due to these differences, when these 
signals were combined, the whole-brain predictor effectively cancels out the history effects while 
the subjective value signal from the current trial remains. This allows the whole-brain predictor to 
match the history dependency of behavior, in which we found no significant effect of the 
subjective value of past trial’s offers on choice. The fact that the whole brain predictor is 
structured to subtract out history effects is striking; it suggests that such history effects are 
intrinsic to all brain areas that respond to value, as otherwise the whole brain predictor could have 




Figure 2 - 8. Average history effects of positive regions, negative regions, and all regions of 
whole-brain predictor. 
For ITC (above) and RC (below) the whole-brain predictor creates a history-free signal by 
canceling out the history effect between the regions. 
 
Discussion 
 In the current paper, we present evidence that neural correlates of value are intrinsically 
history dependent. Separately across two economic decision-making tasks, we find neural signals 
that are not only positively correlated with the subjective value of the current trial’s offer, but also 
negatively correlated with the subjective values of offers on immediate past trials. On the other 
hand, choice behavior in both tasks did not show any influence of past trial’s offers. We construct 
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a whole-brain predictor of choice, as a data-driven way to search for neural value signals without 
history effects. However, examination of our whole-brain predictor shows that it does not operate 
by finding history-free value signals, but rather uses signals from other brain regions to subtract 
out the history effects intrinsic to value correlates.  
Our results have both theoretical and practical implications. On the theoretical side, this 
is the first evidence for trial-by-trial history dependence in the correlates of value in BOLD fMRI 
signals. While similar trial-by-trial dynamics have previously been demonstrated in the firing rate 
of single orbitofrontal neurons (Cox & Kable, 2014), our results strongly suggest history 
dependence is a general feature of value responses across the brain, at least those observed in the 
BOLD signal. These trial-by-trial history dependencies could account for the range adaptation 
observed at longer timescales in the neural value signals measured with either fMRI or single 
neuron recording (Cai & Padoa-Schioppa, 2012; Cox & Kable, 2014; Kobayashi et al., 2010; 
Padoa-Schioppa, 2009). Both range adaptation and the trial-by-trial history dependencies 
observed here may be a result of efficient coding principles, which can favor encoding prediction 
errors to reduce redundancies in the signal(Rao & Ballard, 1999), and has recently been proposed 
to lead to a time-dependent cortical normalization mechanism that impacts value coding in the 
brain (Khaw, Glimcher, & Louie, 2017; Tymula & Glimcher, 2016; Yamada, Louie, Tymula, & 
Glimcher, 2018).  
Critically, the kind of history dependency we observe for value correlates is distinct from 
the kind of repetition suppression or similarity/distance effects that have been widely studied in 
fMRI across different kinds of stimuli and brain regions (Barron et al., 2013; Grill-Spector et al., 
2006; Naccache & Dehaene, 2001; Segaert et al., 2013). In fact, we found no significant 
carryover effects of value distance in the current dataset for either decision task. The distance 
effects that we did observe in both tasks were for the numerically presented attribute values in the 
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intraparietal sulcus. The anatomical location of these effects is consistent with previous studies 
reporting repetition suppression in parietal cortex for numerical representations (Naccache & 
Dehaene, 2001). 
We did not observe any effects of the subjective value of previous trials’ offers on the 
current trial’s choice. This is consistent with a recent proposal that value (or other variables) is 
encoded according to efficient principles, and that downstream decoding and choice processes 
assume (and therefore adjust for) such efficient coding (Polanía, Woodford, & Ruff, 2019; Wei & 
Stocker, 2015). However, at least one recent study has shown that people’s evaluations adapt to 
the range of offers across longer timescales (blocks of 90 trials) (Khaw et al., 2017). Future work 
should examine whether these differences across studies arise from differences in timescale, 
decision-making task (choices versus bids), or other factors. 
Our whole-brain prediction results also illustrate how building neural classifiers or 
predictors with an eye towards interpretability can lead to insights into neural mechanisms. Our 
PCLR-bootstrap method joins other methods that emphasize interpretability (Chang, Gianaros, 
Manuck, Krishnan, & Wager, 2015; Grosenick et al., 2008). The clustering analysis we 
performed on the classifier components revealed a central feature of choice-predictive activity – 
intrinsic history dependence – and how the classifier compensated for this source of “noise”.  
On the practical side, our results suggest that neural prediction studies that use average 
activity from ROIs are likely to experience systematic errors unless the history effects are 
accounted for. In the current study, the whole brain predictor that automatically adjusted for 
neural history effects predicted choices with significantly higher predictive accuracy out of 
sample than ROI-based prediction approaches. Using ROI-based approaches, several previous 
studies have shown that neural measurements from a relatively small number of participants can 
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predict population-level behavior above and beyond traditional behavioral measures such as self-
reports (Berns & Moore, 2012; Genevsky et al., 2017; Karmarkar et al., 2015; Knutson et al., 
2007; Scholz et al., 2017; Venkatraman et al., 2014). We believe that using whole-brain 
predictors, like the one used in the current paper, will increase the predictive power of neural 
measurements in such applications, in part by canceling out the intrinsic history dependence of 























CHAPTER 4 – The Future is Less Concrete than Now: A Neural Signature of the Concreteness of 
Prospective Thought Is Modulated by Temporal Proximity during Intertemporal Decision-
Making 
 






Why do people discount future rewards? Multiple theories in psychology argue that future events 
are imagined less concretely than immediate events, thereby diminishing their perceived value. 
Here we provide neuroscientific evidence for this idea. First, we construct a neural signature of 
the concreteness of prospective thought, using an fMRI dataset where the concreteness of 
imagined future events is orthogonal to their valence by design. Second, we apply this neural 
signature in two additional fMRI datasets, each using a different delay discounting task (bidding 
versus choice), to show that neural measures of concreteness decline as rewards are delayed 







Many of the most important choices we make in our daily lives involve tradeoffs between 
the present and future. Should you spend money now or to save it for retirement? Can I endure 
the immediate pain of nicotine withdrawal in order to enjoy better future health of being a non-
smoker? In such intertemporal decisions, humans tend to devalue, or discount, outcomes in the 
future; a phenomenon known as delay discounting. In the laboratory, this tendency can be 
measured by presenting participants with choices between a smaller monetary amount available 
immediately or a larger monetary amount available after a delay. Patience as measured by 
laboratory intertemporal choice tasks predicts other important aspects of life such as drug and 
alcohol abuse, educational attainment, and personal finances (Alessi & Petry, 2003; Anderson & 
Mellor, 2008; Brañas-Garza, Georgantzís, & Guillén, 2007; Kirby, Petry, Nancy, & Bickel, 
Warren, 1999; Krain et al., 2008; Lejuez, Aklin, Bornovalova, & Moolchan, 2005; Lejuez et al., 
2003; Schepis, McFetridge, Chaplin, Sinha, & Krishnan-Sarin, 2011; Shamosh & Gray, 2008). 
Why, however, are delayed outcomes fundamentally less desirable? Psychologists have 
long pondered this important question. Several theories suggest that one potential explanation is 
that future outcomes are less concrete. Rick and Lowenstein (2008) have pointed out that in many 
intertemporal decisions, delayed outcomes are intrinsically less tangible than sooner ones. For 
example, while smoking now has immediately perceivable pleasure for the smoker, the promise 
of better future health is less appreciable. Similarly, construal level theory proposes that even 
when future outcomes are not intrinsically less tangible, people tend to use a process of high-level 
construal when thinking about future events that leads to them being represented in a more 
abstract way (Liberman & Trope, 2014; Trope & Liberman, 2010). In contrast, when people 
consider sooner events, they use low-level construal and represent them in a more concrete 
manner. Many behavioral studies have provided some support for the central claim that the same 
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outcome is perceived less concretely when it occurs farther in the future rather than more 
immediately (for review, see Liberman & Trope, 2014). However, an ideal test of the idea that 
these differences contribute to discounting would measure concreteness in real time (and more 
directly), while people are making intertemporal decisions, and non-obtrusively, without asking 
the participants about concreteness directly. 
Functional brain imaging has the potential to provide just such a non-obtrusive real time 
test of whether future outcomes are perceived as less concrete during intertemporal decision-
making. Yet, while many fMRI studies have compared brain activity for sooner versus later 
outcomes (for review, see Carter, Meyer, & Huettel, 2010), attributing any neural differences 
specifically to concreteness requires ruling out other potential sources for these differences. 
Perhaps the most important and obvious difference between sooner and later outcomes that could 
drive neural activity is that sooner outcomes are valued more highly than delayed ones; that is, 
brain activity selectively responding for sooner versus later outcomes may reflect valuation, not 
necessarily concreteness. Indeed several previous studies that have compared sooner and later 
outcomes have found increased activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and posterior 
cingulate cortex (PCC), two regions with well-established roles in valuation (Bartra et al., 2013; 
Cooper, Kable, Kim, & Zauberman, 2013; Lee, Parthasarathi, & Kable, 2020; Mitchell, Schirmer, 
Ames, & Gilbert, 2011; Tamir & Mitchell, 2011). Instead, what is required is a neural signature 
that is specifically predictive of concrete versus abstract prospective thought, and independent of 
positive versus negative evaluation. 
In the current study, we use a recently developed novel method to construct a whole-
brain multivariate neural predictor of the concreteness of imagined future events (study 1). To 
train this predictor, we use a prospective imagination dataset (Lee et al., 2020), in which the 
concreteness (high versus low) and valence (positive versus negative) of imagined future events 
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were orthogonal, such that the subsequent neural predictor was specific to concreteness and not 
valence. We then applied the whole-brain neural predictor of concreteness in two separate delay 
discounting task datasets with different evaluation schemes (bidding vs. choice) to test whether 
the temporal distance of monetary options during intertemporal decision-making modulates the 
neural signature of concrete versus abstract imagination. 
Methods 
Prospection Dataset 
 We used a dataset from (Lee et al., 2020) to develop a whole brain predictor of the 
concreteness of imagined future events. This study examined neural activity associated with the 
valence (positive versus negative) and concreteness (high versus low) of imagined future events. 
Twenty-four participants underwent fMRI scanning while imagining thirty-two different future 
scenarios. In a 2x2 design (positive versus negative valence crossed with high versus low 
concreteness), eight different unique scenarios were selected for each condition based on pilot 
testing. Each scenario was repeated twice during the experiment. Participants completed four runs 
and imagined sixteen scenarios per run. Each trial involved up to 5 seconds of participants 
reading the scenario cue, 12 seconds of imagination, and up to 14 seconds in which participants 
rated the concreteness and valence of the imagined event on a 7-point Likert Scale (7 seconds 
each). The trial duration was buffered such that the time the participants did not use in the cue 
phase and the rating phase was appended to the ITI at the end of the trial to make the total 






Delay Discounting Datasets 
We applied the neural predictor of concreteness developed in the prospection dataset in 
two different delay discounting datasets to test whether the neural signature of concreteness is 
modulated by delay during intertemporal decisions. We use one bidding dataset and one choice 
dataset to evaluate the robustness of the results to different task structures. The first dataset we 
used was from Cooper et al., 2013, which involved bidding on delayed rewards. A total of forty 
participants were asked on each trial to indicate an immediate monetary amount that they would 
feel was equivalent to receiving $75 after a given delay, varying from 14 to 364 days. Each trial 
began with a screen of the form “I feel indifferent between receiving $75 in 28 days and receiving 
_____ now”. After the prompt was shown for 3 to 5 seconds, participants were then allowed a 
maximum of 10 seconds to use a button pad to indicate their immediate equivalent amount within 
a range of $0 to $75. Each participant went through four scan runs, each of which involved 
twenty-six questions at different delays, ranging from 14 to 364 days. We removed one 
participant who bid $75 for all trials regardless of delay, as we were not sure whether the 
participant understood the task. An advantage of this dataset is that it presents participants with 
the exact same reward amount at varying delays, thereby allowing us to test whether the neural 
signature of imagination concreteness is modulated by the delay. The flipside of this advantage is 
that only the delay, and not the amount, of the delayed reward is varied across trials. This 
limitation is addressed in the second dataset below. 
The second dataset we used was from Kable et al. 2017, which investigated the effects of 
cognitive training on neural activity during economic decision-making. Here we use the data from 
the intertemporal choice task in the first, baseline, scanning session. One hundred sixty-six 
participants completed four runs of the intertemporal choice task while being scanned. Each run 
consisted of thirty binary choices between a smaller immediate reward of $20 today that was held 
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constant throughout the entire session and a larger delayed reward (e.g., $30 in 7 days) that varied 
in amount and delay from trial to trial. On each trial, the delayed option was shown on the screen; 
the immediate option was not displayed. Participants pressed the left/right buttons on a button pad 
to indicate whether they would like to accept the delayed option shown on the screen and forego 
the immediate reward of $20, or to reject the delayed option and take the immediate reward of 
$20. Participants had up to 4 seconds to respond, and after their response, a checkmark was 
shown on the screen if they accepted the delayed reward and an X was shown on the screen if 
they rejected it. 
 
Image acquisition 
For all datasets, the images were collected with a Siemens 3T Trio scanner with a 32-
channel head coil. High-resolution T1-weighted anatomical images were acquired using an 
MPRAGE sequence (T1 = 1100ms; 160 axial slices, 0.9375 x 0.9375 x 1.000 mm; 192 x 256 
matrix). T2*-weighted functional images were acquired using an EPI sequence with 3mm 
isotropic voxels, 64 x 64 matrix, TR = 3,000ms, TE = 25ms (TE = 30ms for Cooper et al., 2013). 
The prospection dataset’s EPI sequence involved 44 axial slices with 181 volumes (Lee et al., 
2020), the intertemporal bidding dataset’s EPI sequence involved 45 axial slices with 150-152 
volumes (Cooper et al. 2013), and the intertemporal choice dataset’s EPI sequence involved 53 
axial slices with 104 volumes (Kable et al. 2017). Lee et al., (2020) and Kable et al. (2017) 
collected B0 fieldmap images for distortion correction (TR = 1000ms, TE = 2.69 and 5.27ms for 






All datasets were preprocessed via fMRIPrep (Esteban et al., 2019). The details on the 
preprocessing pipeline, as generated by fMRIPrep and unaltered, are available in the 
supplemental materials. In short, all BOLD runs were motion-corrected, slice-time corrected, b0-
map unwarped, registered and resampled to a MNI 2mm template. fMRIPrep does not perform 
smoothing, so it was manually performed after estimating single trial activities (see below). 
 
BOLD deconvolution 
We used beta-series regression (Rissman et al., 2004) to estimate the BOLD activity 
associated with each trial in each of the three datasets. In the prospection dataset, we estimated 
the BOLD activity during the imagination period of 12 seconds. The regressors were time-locked 
to imagination time onset with an event duration of 12 seconds and convolved with a double 
gamma HRF function. In the intertemporal bidding dataset from Cooper et al. (2013), the 
regressors were time-locked to the question period (when participants can see the prompt but 
cannot respond yet) with event duration of 0.1 seconds and convolved with a double gamma HRF 
function. Finally, in the intertemporal choice dataset from Kable et al. (2017), the regressors were 
time-locked to the trial onset period with event duration of 0.1 seconds and convolved with a 
gamma HRF function. In this dataset only, the last trial of each run was excluded from analysis 
because the BOLD activity of the last trial was often not observed due to the termination of the 
scan. After the single trial coefficients were estimated, all images were smoothed with a FWHM 




Concreteness prediction map 
 To create a whole brain predictor of the concreteness of imagined future events, we used 
thresholded partial least squares (TPLS; study 1). TPLS is similar in approach to other methods 
for constructing whole predictors that use principal components analysis (PCA) to reduce the 
dimensionality of the data followed by regression (Chang et al., 2015; Wager, Atlas, Leotti, & 
Rilling, 2011; Wager et al., 2013). The key advantage of TPLS over PCA-based methods is that 
partial least squares (PLS) is used for data-reduction. PLS components maximally explain the 
covariance between the predictors and the outcome, whereas PCA components only explain the 
variance of the predictors. Thus, PLS yields data-reduction that is more pertinent to prediction. 
 We built the whole-brain predictor of concreteness in three steps (Fig. 3-1). First, we 
performed PLS to extract components that maximally explain the covariance between the single 
trial images and the binary concreteness trial categories (high versus low). These components 
consist of a map of weights for each voxel in the brain. PLS also automatically yields coefficients 
for each component that are equivalent to the regression coefficients one would obtain from 
regressing the dependent variables on the components. We also calculated the t-statistics of each 
component as one would get from a regression model (here, given the large number of 
observations, we assume that the t-statistics are approximations of z-statistics). In the second step, 
we back-project the PLS coefficients and z-statistics into the original voxel space by multiplying 
them with the PLS weight maps. This yields coefficients for each of the brain voxels for easier 
interpretation. In the final step, we used the back-projected z-statistics of each voxel to rank their 
variable importance and threshold the voxel coefficient map so that less important voxels are 
removed from the final predictor. This final predictor can be used to obtain a ‘concreteness score’ 
for each brain image by calculating the dot product between the predictor and the image. We 
chose the number of PLS components to use and the level of thresholding based on the 
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combination that gave the highest 24-fold leave-one-person-out cross validation prediction 
performance as measured by the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC). 
 
Figure 3 - 1. Thresholded Partial Least Square (TPLS) approach to building a whole-brain 
predictor. 
From left to right, the TPLS method is outlined. The first step performs partial least squares on 
the brain image data (X) and the dependent variable (Y) in order to extract components that 
maximally explain the variance between X and Y. Each of these components are paired with 
weight maps that describe how each component is a weighted sum of the original voxels. They 
are also associated with regression coefficients and t-statistics (approx. z-stat) from regressing the 
dependent variable onto the components. These regression coefficients and z-stats are multiplied 
with their respective weight maps to yield regression coefficients and z-stats in the original voxel 
space. Using the voxel-level z-stats, the whole-brain predictor is thresholded by removing less 
important voxels (i.e., voxels with smaller absolute z-stats). 
 
Sensitivity and specificity analysis 
 To assess the accuracy of our whole-brain predictor of concreteness, we performed a 
nested 24-fold leave-one-person-out cross validation within the prospection dataset. We trained 
the predictor on data from 23 participants and tested on the one left-out person. Within the 23 
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training participants’ data, we employed an additional 23-fold leave-one-person-out cross 
validation to find the optimal number of components and thresholding level. After the best 
parameters were found, the TPLS model was fitted using all 23 participants and used to predict 
the left out person’s data. Specifically, we tested whether the TPLS model can accurately classify 
the high vs. low concreteness trial categories. Furthermore, we also tested if the TPLS model 
predictions are correlated with the participants’ self-reported ratings of concreteness.  
As we trained the TPLS model on the condition labels for concreteness, and these were 
orthogonal by design to the condition labels for valence, we expected our whole brain predictor to 
be specific to concreteness and not valence. To assess the specificity or our whole brain predictor 
of concreteness, we also tested whether the TPLS model could not accurately classify the positive 
vs. negative valence trial categories, and whether its predictions are not correlated with the 
participants’ ratings of valence. 
 
Concreteness and Delay Discounting 
 To calculate an expression score for the neural signature of concreteness during delay 
discounting, we calculated the dot product between the neural predictor of concreteness and the 
brain image of estimated activity for each trial. These scores were then correlated with the delay 
until the receipt of the delayed reward (in days), and the delayed amount (for Kable et al. 2017 
only, since the delayed amount is constant in Cooper et al. 2013). The correlations were 
performed at the individual level, and each individual’s correlation coefficient was used as a 





We first developed a whole-brain neural predictor of the concreteness of prospective 
thought. We used an fMRI data set of 24 participants imagining possible future events that had 
been categorized a priori as high versus low in concreteness and positive versus negative in 
valence (Lee et al., 2020, Fig 3-2A). We used thresholded partial least squares (TPLS, see Fig. 3-
1) to develop a whole-brain classifier that discriminated events that were high versus low 
concreteness. We checked by cross-validation within the training dataset to ensure that our 
predictor of concreteness could accurately, out-of-sample, predict the concreteness but not the 
valence of imagined future events. As expected, the neural predictor of imagination concreteness 
successfully discriminated the trial categories of high versus low concreteness (mean prediction 
AUC = 62.56%, t-test against 50%, t(23) = 7.38, p < .001), but not the trial categories of positive 
versus negative valence (mean prediction AUC = 51.12%, t-test against 50%, t(23) = 0.73, p = 
.47; Fig. 3-2B). We also further checked whether our predictions were also aligned with the 
participants’ ratings of the concreteness of imagined future events but not with their ratings of 
valence. Again, we found that our predictor was able to predict out-of-sample ratings of 
concreteness but unable to predict ratings of valence (Fig. 3-2C). Mean out-of-sample correlation 
between the neural prediction score and concreteness ratings was r = 0.15 (t(23) = 4.80, p < .001), 
while the correlation between the neural prediction score and valence ratings was r = -0.0069 
(t(23) = -0.26, p = 0.79). 
The whole-brain prediction map of concreteness involved various regions of the brain, 
mostly in a bilateral fashion (Fig. 3-3 & Table 3-1). Positive coefficients (predictive of higher 
concreteness) were found in bilateral hippocampus, bilateral central orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), 
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), bilateral middle occipital gyri, left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(dlPFC), and medial posterior OFC. Negative coefficients (predictive of lower concreteness) were 
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found in bilateral temporal poles, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), bilateral 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ), bilateral middle temporal gyri, and precuneus. 
 
Figure 3 - 2. Out-of-sample prediction of concreteness and valence in prospection dataset 
achieved by 24-fold leave-one-out cross validation. 
Panel A shows the schematic of the prospection task from Lee et al. (2020). A whole-brain 
concreteness predictor is trained on 23 people’s data and used to predict the left-out person’s data. 
Panel B shows classification performance on a priori trial categories of concreteness (high versus 
low) and valence (positive versus negative) as measured by area under the receiver operating 
characteristic curve. Panel C shows correlation with concreteness and valence ratings provided by 
participants. Each dot represents one participant, the vertical bar represents the mean, and the 
horizontal bar represents the 95% confidence interval of the mean. 
 
Figure 3 - 3. Whole-brain predictor of the concreteness of imagined future events built from 
24 participants. 
The warm colors indicate positive coefficients and cool colors indicate negative coefficients. 
Notable regions include bilateral central OFC, PCC, and bilateral hippocampus for positive 
coefficients, and dmPFC, precuneus, and bilateral temporal pole for negative coefficients. 
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Description Size (number of voxels) X Y Z 
Positive 
        Bilateral Hippocampus 1124 voxels (left & right) -27 -30 -12 
        Bilateral Central Orbitofrontal Cortex 169 voxels (left) -25 35 -18 
 306 voxels (right) 24 35 -12 
        Posterior Cingulate Cortex 379 voxels (medial) 4 -36 45 
        Bilateral Middle Occipital Gyri 302 voxels (left) -37 -82 33 
 15 voxels (right) 44 -72 23 
        Left Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex  
                (left middle frontal gyrus) 
70 voxels (left) -39 37 11 
        Medial Posterior Orbitofrontal Cortex 57 voxels (medial) 2 3 -18 
 
Negative 
        Bilateral Temporal Pole 207 voxels (left) -45 19 -26 
 184 voxels (right) 54 9 -26 
        Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex 
                (medial superior frontal gyri) 
104 voxels (medial) -5 59 39 
        Bilateral Temporoparietal Junction 11 voxels (left) -61 -24 21 
 82 voxels (right) 66 -24 23 
        Bilateral Middle Temporal Gyri 25 voxels (left) -61 -14 -14 
 67 voxels (right) 62 -10 -8 
        Precuneus 46 voxels (medial) 2 -58 33 
     
Table 3 - 1. Clusters of whole-brain predictor of imagination concreteness. 
Clusters of voxels that have non-zero coefficients in the final predictor of the concreteness of 
imagined future events are reported, grouped by the sign of the coefficients and ordered by cluster 
size. From left to right, the region names, cluster size in voxels, and MNI coordinates are 
provided. Clusters that are 3 voxels or smaller are not reported. 
 
 We next applied this whole-brain predictor of concreteness in two separate delay 
discounting tasks, in order to test whether the neural signature of concrete future thinking was 
higher when considering sooner rewards and lower when considering later rewards. In both 
datasets we found that neural concreteness scores were negatively correlated with the delay until 
the receipt of the reward, such that farther delays were associated with lower concreteness scores. 
Firstly, in an intertemporal bidding task, participants (n = 39) were presented with a fixed 
monetary outcome of $75 at different delays and asked to report the immediate amount they 
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would feel to be equivalent to the delayed outcome. For each trial, we calculated neural 
concreteness scores by applying the whole brain predictor developed above to the activity for that 
trial. We found that the trial-by-trial neural concreteness scores were correlated negatively with 
delay (Fig. 3-4; mean r = -0.060, t(38) = -3.79, p < .001), such that shorter delays (i.e., more 
proximal future) were associated with higher concreteness scores, and longer delays (i.e., more 
distant future) with lower concreteness scores. 
 
Figure 3 - 4. Out-of-sample prediction of delay in an intertemporal bidding task. 
Panel A shows the bidding task structure from Cooper et al. (2013). Participants are first shown 
the delayed amount of $75 (fixed) and a variable delay and are asked to bid their immediate 
equivalent. Panel B shows the per-person correlation between trial-by-trial delay (sign-flipped) 
and concreteness prediction scores from the whole-brain predictor. The vertical bar represents the 
mean, and the horizontal bar represents the 95% confidence interval of the mean (n = 39). 
 
We replicated this finding in a second dataset in which participants made discrete binary 
choices between immediate and delayed rewards. In this choice task from Kable et al. (2017), 
participants (n = 166) made choices between a fixed immediate reward of $20 and a future reward 
that varied in amount ($21 ~ $85) and delay (20 ~ 180 days) across trials. Again, we found that 
the trial-by-trial neural concreteness scores were correlated negatively with delay (Fig. 3-5; mean 
r = -0.070, t(165) = -9.23, p < .001), such that shorter delays were associated with higher 
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concreteness scores. Furthermore, this association was specific to the delay to reward. Although 
the neural concreteness scores were also positively correlated with the delayed amount (mean r = 
0.037, t(165) = 4.25, p < .001), concreteness was more strongly associated with delay than 
amount (paired t-test, t(165) = 3.15, p = 0.0019). 
 
Figure 3 - 5. Out-of-sample prediction of delay in an intertemporal choice task. 
Panel A shows the choice task structure from Kable et al. (2017). Participants are shown the 
delayed reward and are asked to either accept it or to reject it for $20 immediately. Panel B shows 
the per-person correlation between trial-by-trial delay (sign-flipped) and concreteness prediction 
scores in comparison to that between trial-by-trial amount and concreteness prediction scores 
(delay has been sign-flipped to facilitate this comparison). The vertical bar represents the mean, 
and the horizontal bar represents the 95% confidence interval of the mean (n = 166). 
 
Discussion 
 Multiple theories in psychology have suggested that delayed outcomes are discounted in 
value relative to immediate outcomes in part because more temporally distant options are 
perceived as less concrete and tangible than more temporally proximal ones (Liberman & Trope, 
2014; Rick & Loewenstein, 2008; Trope & Liberman, 2010). These theories have been supported 
by a range of via various behavioral experiments (Bischoff & Hansen, 2016; Kelley & 
Schmeichel, 2015; Liberman & Trope, 2014; Malkoc, Zauberman, & Bettman, 2010; Mischel & 
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Baker, 1975; Yi, Stuppy-Sullivan, Pickover, & Landes, 2017). Here we add converging 
neuroscientific evidence to these theories. We used fMRI data during an imagination task to 
create a whole-brain, multivariate predictor specific to the concreteness of prospective thought, 
independent of the valence of prospective thought. Then we show, in two separate delay 
discounting datasets with markedly different task structure (one bidding task, one choice task), 
that the neural signature of concreteness is modulated by the temporal distance to the delayed 
option under consideration. That is, the pattern of neural activity that predicts more concrete 
prospective thinking is stronger for more temporally proximal outcomes and weaker for more 
temporally distal ones. The neural signature of concreteness was also more strongly modulated by 
the delay to reward than by the magnitude of reward. These results show that, while people are 
making intertemporal decisions, an online, unobtrusive neural index of concrete thinking declines 
as the outcomes considered are delayed farther into the future.   
 Our results complement previous tests of construal level theory using fMRI. These 
studies have shown that neural activity associated with imagining near events, compared to 
distant events, overlaps with neural activity engaged by other forms of psychological proximity or 
by low- versus high-level construal (Stillman et al., 2017; Tamir & Mitchell, 2011). Here we 
make two advances over these previous results. First, we distinguish between neural activity due 
to the concreteness, versus the valence, of prospective thought. This is critical as several previous 
studies have found the strongest increases in activity for sooner, compared to later, events in the 
mPFC and PCC (Mitchell et al., 2011; Tamir & Mitchell, 2011), two regions that we have 
previously shown are associated with the valence of prospective thought (Lee et al., 2020). 
Second, we show that a neural index of concreteness is modulated by the delay to the outcome 
during intertemporal decision-making. This links reduced concreteness directly to the discounting 
of future rewards, a process known to be associated with many important life outcomes (Alessi & 
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Petry, 2003; Anderson & Mellor, 2008; Brañas-Garza et al., 2007; Kirby et al., 1999; Krain et al., 
2008; Lejuez et al., 2005, 2003; Schepis et al., 2011; Shamosh & Gray, 2008).  
The whole-brain prediction map for concreteness is remarkably consistent with findings from 
other lines of research. Several previous studies have argued that the orbitofrontal represents the 
features of potential outcomes during decision making (Burke, Franz, Miller, & Schoenbaum, 
2008; Howard, Gottfried, Tobler, & Kahnt, 2015; Y. K. Takahashi et al., 2013), and that 
interactions with the hippocampus may be critical for generating these representations from 
memory (for review, see Shohamy & Daw, 2015). Furthermore, there is evidence that these 
regions play a role in valuing delayed rewards. Lesions to the OFC caused increased impatience 
(Sellitto, Ciaramelli, & Di Pellegrino, 2010), and reduced grey matter thickness in both the OFC 
(Pehlivanova et al., 2018) and the medial temporal lobe (Lempert et al., 2020; Owens et al., 2017) 
is associated with increased discounting. Correspondingly, we would expect that modulating 
activity in these regions as people consider future outcomes would alter the concreteness with 
which those outcomes are imagined and the degree to which those outcomes are discounted. 
To obtain the current results, we applied a novel adaptation of partial least squares optimized to 
construct interpretable whole-brain predictors with minimal computation time (study 1). Though 
many different methods for constructing whole brain predictors have been proposed (Grosenick et 
al., 2008; Kragel & LaBar, 2014; Smith et al., 2014; Wager et al., 2013), none have yet achieved 
widespread use in the field. Here we illustrate what we think is the most promising and exciting 






Image preprocessing for prospection dataset 
 
Results included in this manuscript come from preprocessing performed using fMRIPrep 20.0.7 
(Esteban, Markiewicz, et al. (2018); Esteban, Blair, et al. (2018); RRID:SCR_016216), which is 
based on Nipype 1.4.2 (Gorgolewski et al. (2011); Gorgolewski et al. (2018); 
RRID:SCR_002502). 
Anatomical data preprocessing. The T1-weighted (T1w) image was corrected for intensity non-
uniformity (INU) with N4BiasFieldCorrection (Tustison et al. 2010), distributed with ANTs 2.2.0 
(Avants et al. 2008, RRID:SCR_004757), and used as T1w-reference throughout the workflow. 
The T1w-reference was then skull-stripped with a Nipype implementation of the 
antsBrainExtraction.sh workflow (from ANTs), using OASIS30ANTs as target template. Brain 
tissue segmentation of cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), white-matter (WM) and gray-matter (GM) was 
performed on the brain-extracted T1w using fast (FSL 5.0.9, RRID:SCR_002823, Zhang, Brady, 
and Smith 2001). Volume-based spatial normalization to one standard space 
(MNI152NLin2009cAsym) was performed through nonlinear registration with antsRegistration 
(ANTs 2.2.0), using brain-extracted versions of both T1w reference and the T1w template. The 
following template was selected for spatial normalization: ICBM 152 Nonlinear Asymmetrical 
template version 2009c [Fonov et al. (2009), RRID:SCR_008796; TemplateFlow ID: 
MNI152NLin2009cAsym], 
 
Functional data preprocessing. For each of the 4 BOLD runs found per subject (across all tasks 
and sessions), the following preprocessing was performed. First, a reference volume and its skull-
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stripped version were generated using a custom methodology of fMRIPrep. A B0-nonuniformity 
map (or fieldmap) was estimated based on a phase-difference map calculated with a dual-echo 
GRE (gradient-recall echo) sequence, processed with a custom workflow of SDCFlows inspired 
by the epidewarp.fsl script and further improvements in HCP Pipelines (Glasser et al. 2013). The 
fieldmap was then co-registered to the target EPI (echo-planar imaging) reference run and 
converted to a displacements field map (amenable to registration tools such as ANTs) with FSL’s 
fugue and other SDCflows tools. Based on the estimated susceptibility distortion, a corrected EPI 
(echo-planar imaging) reference was calculated for a more accurate co-registration with the 
anatomical reference. The BOLD reference was then co-registered to the T1w reference using 
flirt (FSL 5.0.9, Jenkinson and Smith 2001) with the boundary-based registration (Greve and 
Fischl 2009) cost-function. Co-registration was configured with nine degrees of freedom to 
account for distortions remaining in the BOLD reference. Head-motion parameters with respect 
to the BOLD reference (transformation matrices, and six corresponding rotation and translation 
parameters) are estimated before any spatiotemporal filtering using mcflirt (FSL 5.0.9, Jenkinson 
et al. 2002). BOLD runs were slice-time corrected using 3dTshift from AFNI 20160207 (Cox and 
Hyde 1997, RRID:SCR_005927). The BOLD time-series (including slice-timing correction when 
applied) were resampled onto their original, native space by applying a single, composite 
transform to correct for head-motion and susceptibility distortions. These resampled BOLD time-
series will be referred to as preprocessed BOLD in original space, or just preprocessed BOLD. 
The BOLD time-series were resampled into standard space, generating a preprocessed BOLD run 
in MNI152NLin2009cAsym space. First, a reference volume and its skull-stripped version were 
generated using a custom methodology of fMRIPrep. Several confounding time-series were 
calculated based on the preprocessed BOLD: framewise displacement (FD), DVARS and three 
region-wise global signals. FD and DVARS are calculated for each functional run, both using 
their implementations in Nipype (following the definitions by Power et al. 2014). The three 
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global signals are extracted within the CSF, the WM, and the whole-brain masks. Additionally, a 
set of physiological regressors were extracted to allow for component-based noise correction 
(CompCor, Behzadi et al. 2007). Principal components are estimated after high-pass filtering the 
preprocessed BOLD time-series (using a discrete cosine filter with 128s cut-off) for the two 
CompCor variants: temporal (tCompCor) and anatomical (aCompCor). tCompCor components 
are then calculated from the top 5% variable voxels within a mask covering the subcortical 
regions. This subcortical mask is obtained by heavily eroding the brain mask, which ensures it 
does not include cortical GM regions. For aCompCor, components are calculated within the 
intersection of the aforementioned mask and the union of CSF and WM masks calculated in T1w 
space, after their projection to the native space of each functional run (using the inverse BOLD-
to-T1w transformation). Components are also calculated separately within the WM and CSF 
masks. For each CompCor decomposition, the k components with the largest singular values are 
retained, such that the retained components’ time series are sufficient to explain 50 percent of 
variance across the nuisance mask (CSF, WM, combined, or temporal). The remaining 
components are dropped from consideration. The head-motion estimates calculated in the 
correction step were also placed within the corresponding confounds file. The confound time 
series derived from head motion estimates and global signals were expanded with the inclusion of 
temporal derivatives and quadratic terms for each (Satterthwaite et al. 2013). Frames that 
exceeded a threshold of 0.5 mm FD or 1.5 standardised DVARS were annotated as motion 
outliers. All resamplings can be performed with a single interpolation step by composing all the 
pertinent transformations (i.e. head-motion transform matrices, susceptibility distortion correction 
when available, and co-registrations to anatomical and output spaces). Gridded (volumetric) 
resamplings were performed using antsApplyTransforms (ANTs), configured with Lanczos 
interpolation to minimize the smoothing effects of other kernels (Lanczos 1964). Non-gridded 




Image preprocessing for delay discounting bidding dataset 
 
Results included in this manuscript come from preprocessing performed using fMRIPrep 20.1.1 
(Esteban, Markiewicz, et al. (2018); Esteban, Blair, et al. (2018); RRID:SCR_016216), which is 
based on Nipype 1.5.0 (Gorgolewski et al. (2011); Gorgolewski et al. (2018); 
RRID:SCR_002502). 
 
Anatomical data preprocessing. A total of 1 T1-weighted (T1w) images were found within the 
input BIDS dataset.The T1-weighted (T1w) image was corrected for intensity non-uniformity 
(INU) with N4BiasFieldCorrection (Tustison et al. 2010), distributed with ANTs 2.2.0 (Avants et 
al. 2008, RRID:SCR_004757), and used as T1w-reference throughout the workflow. The T1w-
reference was then skull-stripped with a Nipype implementation of the antsBrainExtraction.sh 
workflow (from ANTs), using OASIS30ANTs as target template. Brain tissue segmentation of 
cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), white-matter (WM) and gray-matter (GM) was performed on the 
brain-extracted T1w using fast (FSL 5.0.9, RRID:SCR_002823, Zhang, Brady, and Smith 2001). 
Volume-based spatial normalization to one standard space (MNI152NLin2009cAsym) was 
performed through nonlinear registration with antsRegistration (ANTs 2.2.0), using brain-
extracted versions of both T1w reference and the T1w template. The following template was 
selected for spatial normalization: ICBM 152 Nonlinear Asymmetrical template version 2009c 




Functional data preprocessing. For each of the 4 BOLD runs found per subject (across all tasks 
and sessions), the following preprocessing was performed. First, a reference volume and its skull-
stripped version were generated using a custom methodology of fMRIPrep. Head-motion 
parameters with respect to the BOLD reference (transformation matrices, and six corresponding 
rotation and translation parameters) are estimated before any spatiotemporal filtering using 
mcflirt (FSL 5.0.9, Jenkinson et al. 2002). BOLD runs were slice-time corrected using 3dTshift 
from AFNI 20160207 (Cox and Hyde 1997, RRID:SCR_005927). Susceptibility distortion 
correction (SDC) was omitted. The BOLD reference was then co-registered to the T1w reference 
using flirt (FSL 5.0.9, Jenkinson and Smith 2001) with the boundary-based registration (Greve 
and Fischl 2009) cost-function. Co-registration was configured with nine degrees of freedom to 
account for distortions remaining in the BOLD reference. The BOLD time-series (including slice-
timing correction when applied) were resampled onto their original, native space by applying the 
transforms to correct for head-motion. These resampled BOLD time-series will be referred to as 
preprocessed BOLD in original space, or just preprocessed BOLD. The BOLD time-series were 
resampled into standard space, generating a preprocessed BOLD run in MNI152NLin2009cAsym 
space. First, a reference volume and its skull-stripped version were generated using a custom 
methodology of fMRIPrep. Several confounding time-series were calculated based on the 
preprocessed BOLD: framewise displacement (FD), DVARS and three region-wise global 
signals. FD was computed using two formulations following Power (absolute sum of relative 
motions, Power et al. (2014)) and Jenkinson (relative root mean square displacement between 
affines, Jenkinson et al. (2002)). FD and DVARS are calculated for each functional run, both 
using their implementations in Nipype (following the definitions by Power et al. 2014). The three 
global signals are extracted within the CSF, the WM, and the whole-brain masks. Additionally, a 
set of physiological regressors were extracted to allow for component-based noise correction 
(CompCor, Behzadi et al. 2007). Principal components are estimated after high-pass filtering the 
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preprocessed BOLD time-series (using a discrete cosine filter with 128s cut-off) for the two 
CompCor variants: temporal (tCompCor) and anatomical (aCompCor). tCompCor components 
are then calculated from the top 5% variable voxels within a mask covering the subcortical 
regions. This subcortical mask is obtained by heavily eroding the brain mask, which ensures it 
does not include cortical GM regions. For aCompCor, components are calculated within the 
intersection of the aforementioned mask and the union of CSF and WM masks calculated in T1w 
space, after their projection to the native space of each functional run (using the inverse BOLD-
to-T1w transformation). Components are also calculated separately within the WM and CSF 
masks. For each CompCor decomposition, the k components with the largest singular values are 
retained, such that the retained components’ time series are sufficient to explain 50 percent of 
variance across the nuisance mask (CSF, WM, combined, or temporal). The remaining 
components are dropped from consideration. The head-motion estimates calculated in the 
correction step were also placed within the corresponding confounds file. The confound time 
series derived from head motion estimates and global signals were expanded with the inclusion of 
temporal derivatives and quadratic terms for each (Satterthwaite et al. 2013). Frames that 
exceeded a threshold of 0.5 mm FD or 1.5 standardised DVARS were annotated as motion 
outliers. All resamplings can be performed with a single interpolation step by composing all the 
pertinent transformations (i.e. head-motion transform matrices, susceptibility distortion correction 
when available, and co-registrations to anatomical and output spaces). Gridded (volumetric) 
resamplings were performed using antsApplyTransforms (ANTs), configured with Lanczos 
interpolation to minimize the smoothing effects of other kernels (Lanczos 1964). Non-gridded 
(surface) resamplings were performed using mri_vol2surf (FreeSurfer). 
 
Image preprocessing for delay discounting choice dataset 
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Results included in this manuscript come from preprocessing performed using fMRIPrep 20.0.5 
(Esteban, Markiewicz, et al. (2018); Esteban, Blair, et al. (2018); RRID:SCR_016216), which is 
based on Nipype 1.4.2 (Gorgolewski et al. (2011); Gorgolewski et al. (2018); 
RRID:SCR_002502). 
 
Anatomical data preprocessing. A total of 2 T1-weighted (T1w) images were found within the 
input BIDS dataset. All of them were corrected for intensity non-uniformity (INU) with 
N4BiasFieldCorrection (Tustison et al. 2010), distributed with ANTs 2.2.0 (Avants et al. 2008, 
RRID:SCR_004757). The T1w-reference was then skull-stripped with a Nipype implementation 
of the antsBrainExtraction.sh workflow (from ANTs), using OASIS30ANTs as target template. 
Brain tissue segmentation of cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), white-matter (WM) and gray-matter 
(GM) was performed on the brain-extracted T1w using fast (FSL 5.0.9, RRID:SCR_002823, 
Zhang, Brady, and Smith 2001). A T1w-reference map was computed after registration of 2 T1w 
images (after INU-correction) using mri_robust_template (FreeSurfer 6.0.1, Reuter, Rosas, and 
Fischl 2010). Volume-based spatial normalization to one standard space 
(MNI152NLin2009cAsym) was performed through nonlinear registration with antsRegistration 
(ANTs 2.2.0), using brain-extracted versions of both T1w reference and the T1w template. The 
following template was selected for spatial normalization: ICBM 152 Nonlinear Asymmetrical 
template version 2009c [Fonov et al. (2009), RRID:SCR_008796; TemplateFlow ID: 
MNI152NLin2009cAsym], 
 
Functional data preprocessing. For each of the 18 BOLD runs found per subject (across all tasks 
and sessions), the following preprocessing was performed. First, a reference volume and its skull-
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stripped version were generated using a custom methodology of fMRIPrep. A B0-nonuniformity 
map (or fieldmap) was estimated based on a phase-difference map calculated with a dual-echo 
GRE (gradient-recall echo) sequence, processed with a custom workflow of SDCFlows inspired 
by the epidewarp.fsl script and further improvements in HCP Pipelines (Glasser et al. 2013). The 
fieldmap was then co-registered to the target EPI (echo-planar imaging) reference run and 
converted to a displacements field map (amenable to registration tools such as ANTs) with FSL’s 
fugue and other SDCflows tools. Based on the estimated susceptibility distortion, a corrected EPI 
(echo-planar imaging) reference was calculated for a more accurate co-registration with the 
anatomical reference. The BOLD reference was then co-registered to the T1w reference using 
flirt (FSL 5.0.9, Jenkinson and Smith 2001) with the boundary-based registration (Greve and 
Fischl 2009) cost-function. Co-registration was configured with nine degrees of freedom to 
account for distortions remaining in the BOLD reference. Head-motion parameters with respect 
to the BOLD reference (transformation matrices, and six corresponding rotation and translation 
parameters) are estimated before any spatiotemporal filtering using mcflirt (FSL 5.0.9, Jenkinson 
et al. 2002). BOLD runs were slice-time corrected using 3dTshift from AFNI 20160207 (Cox and 
Hyde 1997, RRID:SCR_005927). The BOLD time-series (including slice-timing correction when 
applied) were resampled onto their original, native space by applying a single, composite 
transform to correct for head-motion and susceptibility distortions. These resampled BOLD time-
series will be referred to as preprocessed BOLD in original space, or just preprocessed BOLD. 
The BOLD time-series were resampled into standard space, generating a preprocessed BOLD run 
in MNI152NLin2009cAsym space. First, a reference volume and its skull-stripped version were 
generated using a custom methodology of fMRIPrep. Several confounding time-series were 
calculated based on the preprocessed BOLD: framewise displacement (FD), DVARS and three 
region-wise global signals. FD and DVARS are calculated for each functional run, both using 
their implementations in Nipype (following the definitions by Power et al. 2014). The three 
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global signals are extracted within the CSF, the WM, and the whole-brain masks. Additionally, a 
set of physiological regressors were extracted to allow for component-based noise correction 
(CompCor, Behzadi et al. 2007). Principal components are estimated after high-pass filtering the 
preprocessed BOLD time-series (using a discrete cosine filter with 128s cut-off) for the two 
CompCor variants: temporal (tCompCor) and anatomical (aCompCor). tCompCor components 
are then calculated from the top 5% variable voxels within a mask covering the subcortical 
regions. This subcortical mask is obtained by heavily eroding the brain mask, which ensures it 
does not include cortical GM regions. For aCompCor, components are calculated within the 
intersection of the aforementioned mask and the union of CSF and WM masks calculated in T1w 
space, after their projection to the native space of each functional run (using the inverse BOLD-
to-T1w transformation). Components are also calculated separately within the WM and CSF 
masks. For each CompCor decomposition, the k components with the largest singular values are 
retained, such that the retained components’ time series are sufficient to explain 50 percent of 
variance across the nuisance mask (CSF, WM, combined, or temporal). The remaining 
components are dropped from consideration. The head-motion estimates calculated in the 
correction step were also placed within the corresponding confounds file. The confound time 
series derived from head motion estimates and global signals were expanded with the inclusion of 
temporal derivatives and quadratic terms for each (Satterthwaite et al. 2013). Frames that 
exceeded a threshold of 0.5 mm FD or 1.5 standardised DVARS were annotated as motion 
outliers. All resamplings can be performed with a single interpolation step by composing all the 
pertinent transformations (i.e. head-motion transform matrices, susceptibility distortion correction 
when available, and co-registrations to anatomical and output spaces). Gridded (volumetric) 
resamplings were performed using antsApplyTransforms (ANTs), configured with Lanczos 
interpolation to minimize the smoothing effects of other kernels (Lanczos 1964). Non-gridded 
(surface) resamplings were performed using mri_vol2surf (FreeSurfer).
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CHAPTER 5 - GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
This dissertation examined a novel construction algorithm of whole-brain decoders and 
how whole-brain decoders can aid neuroscientific and psychological research. The overarching 
goal of the three studies has been to provide an easy to implement method for whole-brain 
decoder construction and to demonstrate its potential uses in substantive research. The first study 
addressed two common difficulties with creating a whole-brain decoder: interpretability and 
computational burden. By exploiting analytical properties of partial least squares, I proposed 
Thresholded Partial Least Squares (TPLS), which can create interpretable whole-brain decoders 
in much shorter time compared to existing approaches and also yield interpretable decoders. In 
coming years, as neuroimaging datasets grow larger in size, I hope that provided algorithm and 
the statistical package will be useful for many researchers. 
In the second study, I demonstrated how an interpretable whole-brain decoder can be 
interpreted. I built a whole-brain decoder of valuation based on two large behavioral economic 
decision-making tasks. Thanks to the interpretability of the whole-brain decoder, I found that 
numerous regions were shown to be negatively predictive of value-based choice despite the fact 
that no regions were negatively correlated with said choice. This provided the hint that there may 
be common ‘noise’ among the value signals that the whole-brain decoder attempted to cancel out 
by pitting regions against each other with opposing signs. When I decomposed valuation signals 
in the brain into signals related to valuation of the current trial versus past trials, I found that 
neural signals of valuation in the brain had history dependency while behavior did not. More 
specifically, neural signals of value varied in magnitude depending on the valuation of the past 
trials’ options, while participants’ choices regarding the current trial did not depend on the 
valuation of the past trials’ options. While this does not necessarily implicate that our brain 
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actually renders decisions based on combinations of multiple regions’ signal, it does showcase 
how whole-brain decoders combine signals across the brain and how examining it can yield novel 
insights about the valuation signal. 
In the third study, I show an example of how whole-brain decoders can empirically 
measure mental states and processes that are difficult to probe otherwise. Several psychological 
theories have posited that one possible reason for discounting delayed rewards is because future 
rewards are imagined less vividly than immediate rewards (Liberman & Trope, 2014; Rick & 
Loewenstein, 2008; Trope & Liberman, 2010). I provide neural evidence for this claim by 
constructing a whole-brain decoder of imagination vividness and showing that indeed, when the 
decoder is applied to peoples’ brain images in delay discounting tasks, peoples’ imagination 
vividness scores are negatively correlated with the delay until the receipt of the reward. This 
study, in its simple design, demonstrates the benefit of generalized brain-decoders that can 
empirically measure and predict private mental processes that are otherwise hard to measure.  
While the dissertation has highlighted the substantive benefits gained from the whole-
brain decoders, there can be many practical benefits to be gained by the whole-brain decoder of 
valuation and imagination vividness, which were constructed in this dissertation. In business 
research, accurate forecasting of the market’s preference for new items is critically important, and 
recent research has shown promising signs that the market-level preference can be predicted from 
neural readings of smaller test groups (Berns & Moore, 2012; Genevsky et al., 2017; 
Venkatraman et al., 2014). While many of these studies have used the partial-brain approach of 
prediction, a generalized whole-brain decoder of value could prove to be more robust in 
predicting market-level preferences. Of course, it is possible that the partial-brain predictor of 
market-level preference may be better than the whole-brain predictor of individual preferences, at 
least for market-level prediction. In such cases, one could consider directly constructing the 
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whole-brain decoder of market-level preference and comparing it against that of individual 
preference to see how they differ. Outside business research, the predictors can also be useful in 
communications research where mental responses elicited from public messages or 
advertisements can be predictive of subsequent behavioral change. For example, in a recent study, 
Schmälzle et al. (2020) have found that anti-smoking web banners that measured as being more 
negatively valenced and more vivid, based on the predictors created from study 3, were less likely 
to be clicked at the population level, suggesting that whole-brain decoder of mental processes can 
provide valuable tools of predicting population-level behavior. 
It is important to note that the whole-brain decoding method, presented here, is not meant 
to be a substitute to traditional mass-univariate analysis; rather, it should be used in conjunction 
to yield insight. Traditional fMRI analysis methods, using mass-univariate analysis, assess the 
correlation between the signal of interest and voxel activity. The whole-brain decoder presented 
here, attempts to predict the signal of interest using combinations of voxel activity. As in the case 
with regression, predictive voxels that are positively correlated with signal of interest may have 
negative coefficients when entered into a regression, depending on other variables. This 
difference is most well exemplified in study 2, where several regions were given negative 
coefficients in the whole-brain predictor of value-based choice, while traditional mass-univariate 
analysis led to positive coefficients for all regions. This difference was the key insight in 
understanding that 1) all value signals are similar to each other, but 2) pitting them against each 
other may help prediction by canceling out some noise. Hence, while the interpretability of the 
whole-brain decoder allows for identification of predictive regions and their regression 
coefficients, the predictor must be understood and interpreted together with traditional univariate 
methods as well. 
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Additionally, the whole-brain decoding method does not supersede partial-brain 
prediction methods either. Again, they should be used in conjunction with each other. Partial-
brain decoders (i.e., typical MVPA methods) excel in localizing the signal and answering a priori 
questions about whether a given region can predict/decode certain mental states or behavior. 
Whole-brain decoders, on the other hand, only deal with whether and how the entire brain can 
predict a given mental state or behavior. Hence, it is feasible that regions identified as being 
predictive in a whole-brain decoder may not be able to predict mental states or behavior by itself. 
This may be either due to the signal within the region not being strong enough to be standalone 
predictors, or it may be due to that region only being useful in prediction in combination with 
other regions. 
One important caveat of the whole-brain decoder approach is that, in contrast to mass-
univariate methods, it does not provide measures of variability or statistical significance tests. 
This is not specific to whole-brain decoders but is true for most modern regression algorithms: 
while the models are fit using cross-validation so as to maximize out-of-sample predictive 
performance, there’s no guarantee about the stability of the fitted models as they are subject to 
change should one choose a different cross-validation scheme. Given the lack of consensus on 
what a best cross-validation scheme is, especially in neuroimaging, a larger dataset would be 
better at dealing with this problem as it would be less subject to spurious changes in signal due to 
cross-validation data splits. Regardless, care should be taken in interpreting the whole-brain 
decoders as they are not a result of a statistical test, unlike typical mass-univariate analysis maps. 
Furthermore, it can be useful to consider sensitivity analysis using various cross-validation 
schemes to check the robustness of the results. 
In future research, correlational relationship between different whole-brain decoders can 
be investigated to serve as a measure of ‘neural distance’, which reflect how much two different 
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mental processes share similar brain activities. Whole-brain decoder of different tasks may be 
used to measure neural similarities between tasks and validated against behavioral similarities to 
examine how different tasks are related to one another. Such research may shed insight into why 
certain mental disorders are likely to impact certain sets of behaviors together more so than other 
behaviors. In alternate use of whole-brain decoders, they can also be constructed in two different 
sub-populations (e.g., healthy and clinical) to compare the mental processes between them. In 
clinical research, such characterization of abnormal mental processes via neural signatures can 
prove to be a useful diagnostic tool that can detect psychological abnormalities in neural 
functions even before behavioral manifestations. If individually-tailored whole-brain decoders are 
possible, future research may apply clustering algorithms across peoples’ brain decoders to 
identify subgroups and heterogeneity of mental processes within the same task. 
Whole-brain decoders, as sci-fi as it sounds, have a lot of potential use in neuroscientific 
and psychological research, both substantive and applied. Not only do we get to learn about the 
brain in ways we did not before, we also get the closest thing to mind reading. After all, haven’t 
we all thought to ourselves, ‘if only I could read minds?’ I hope this dissertation invites and 
convinces more researchers to consider using whole-brain decoders in their research and someday 
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